


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German-German ties: warm spot in a cold world

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

International anxiety is growing about the direction German politics is taking. Fears are being expressed about trends towards neutralism and appeasement towards the East.

Attempts by the Opposition Social Democrats to keep pace with the trends are not helping to allay suspicions.

However, although there have been changes in German society, they are not as sinister as many foreigners fear.

Admittedly, unrest in West German society is on the increase. Other Western countries have unhappy memories of Germans rarin' to go.

Intellectuals abroad are more worried than most people in this country realise. They talk in terms of left-wing nationalism or national pacifism. SPD opposition to missile deployment is seen as backsliding straight into neutralism.

The peace movement's rejection of any kind of nuclear armament is seen as readiness to surrender to the East.

A spectre is again stalking Europe. It is the spectre of Germany going it alone.

A correspondingly suspicious view is taken in both East and West of the way that intra-German ties seem hardly to be suffering from the chill in world affairs.

Both see a nod as being as good as a wink across the Wall in both directions. Both are worried about the strange and sinister Germans who may even be serious about reunification.

When Willy Brandt invited East Berlin to be a little more obliging and show greater understanding he could be sure of general approval.

Today the mere attempt to continue this policy despite all difficulties is viewed uneasily. Is Germany to be a constant source of unrest in the heart of Europe? Are the unpredictable Germans long on feeling but short on common sense?

What a relief it was for all Europeans when the Germans came to terms with the fate that befell them through no fault of their own and uncomplainingly took their place in the two pacts!

Only when this sense of relief is borne in mind can it be understood why any sign of independence or desire for a special identity will be seen as a dangerous threat to political order.

Fear of the Germans is so deep-seated that the seeds of national sentiment are viewed from the outset in outsize proportions.

That is not all. The diffident quest for new orientations by Social Democrats and alternative thinkers is condemned before it is as much as analysed.

But at least Western neighbours ought to be reassured by the fact that the alleged new nationalism of left-wing Germans has nothing to do with the historic credo that Germany is called on to right the world's ills.

In reality this new nationalism testifies to an internationalism that runs totally counter to German traditions and is still based in part on the ideas of a student movement that was really not restricted to the Federal Republic.

Intellectual and moral identity is no longer sought in national considerations of whatever kind but in international solidarity in dealings with the superpowers as they strive for hegemony.

This is an appeal to Europe, and to the Third World too, and although it may be a little fanciful the "sinister" Germans cannot be said to be aggressive.

All that is sinister is that they are calling into question an order in which everyone in East and West has been able to settle down quite comfortably.

Regardless of propaganda thunder, no-one in Moscow seriously wants the West Germans to break alliance ranks. Bonn's Nato membership stands for stability and security.

By the same token the West has no desire to see the East Germans break ranks, and no matter how meek and mild the Germans are, united or divided, their geopolitical situation makes them a prime factor for uncertainty.

Whenever they ponder over any kind of special approach, arguably with the best of humanitarian intentions, they are promptly caught up by their history and the power-political facts of life in the heart of Europe.

That need not prevent anyone from intellectual consideration of new approaches, but it would be as well not to be too enthusiastic about fielding a European option against the great powers, say, or advocating common interests with the Third World countries.

But Germans, especially young Germans, have a right to not being constantly compared with their swastika-bearing or field-grey Prussian forebears.

The independent approach some are seeking may lead them down the garden path, but it does at least deserve to be given fair consideration.

Joachim Worthmann

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 28 December 1983)

Warm hands across the cold divide
(Cartoon: Hanel/Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger)

1983 should have been the Year of Detente

DIE ZEIT

For a time last summer, it seemed as if relations between East and West might improve. The superpowers stopped abusing each other quite so hard. Cautious feelers were put out.

It seemed possible that Mr Reagan and Mr Andropov might even meet. Or that their foreign ministers might hold talks.

Then Russian jets shot down the South Korean Jumbo jet. The 269 passengers and crew died. And the diffidently spun threads between East and West snapped.

The appalling over-reaction of the Soviet air defence system was made out in the West to be cold-blooded murder and by the East to be justified defensive action against enemy spies.

President Reagan immediately stressed his readiness to keep talking with the Russians, but the opportunity was missed. International outrage was so strong that the Soviet Union dug in.

The gap between the superpowers has since been as wide as it was at the beginning of 1983, and bids by European governments in both East and West to reactivate talks between them have been fruitless.

In Mr Reagan's view the Soviet Union is governed by the aggressive impulses of an empire of evil with which negotiations are only possible, if at all, from a position of clear military strength.

For Mr Andropov there can be no doubt about the militant character of US policy. At the end of September he said that:

"If anyone has so far still had illusions of a possible change for the better in the policy of the present American government, then the latest events will have shattered them for good."

The Soviet leaders have abandoned for the time being any hope of doing business with President Reagan. In December the Soviet delegations at all rounds of disarmament talks were recalled without agreement on resumption dates.

Yet there was no lack of diplomatic activity in 1983. In Geneva the Americans and Russians held talks on limiting medium-range and intercontinental missiles.

In Vienna Nato and Warsaw Pact delegations held talks on troop cuts in Central Europe. In Madrid the East, the West and the non-aligned discussed European security.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe agreed to hold a fresh conference that was due to convene in Stockholm in January.

Neither side tired of announcing in the glare of international publicity what would have been better discussed behind closed doors.

Both went into details of concessions, either actual or purported, for the Geneva talks. There were Prague appeals and Brussels declarations.

If diplomatic activity and the volume of protestations were any guide, 1983 ought to have been the Year of Detente.

But when complex negotiations are conducted in public, as it were, the aim

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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Disunited East Bloc seeks a way out over arms wrangle

Nordwest-Zeitung

Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers met in Warsaw during Christmas week to review their position now Nato has embarked on missile deployment in Europe.

Officially the delegations dealt with the Stockholm conference on all-European confidence-building measures and disarmament that is due to begin in mid-January.

Unofficially they are said to have discussed ways of resuming East-West disarmament talks within a new framework and without losing face.

The Kremlin has come to realise that few, if any, of its allies are keen on massive counter-armament. Rumania has even headed what might be termed an opposition within the Warsaw Pact.

Bucharest has called in no uncertain terms for a partial scrapping of Soviet SS-20 missile systems, and although the others have not gone that far, even the GDR and Czechoslovakia have put forward surprisingly dialectical arguments.

East German leader Erich Honecker, of all people, tucked away in the usual warnings to the West the comment that existing missile systems were much more extensive than Nato thought.

In other words, no new weapons were needed in response to the deployment of American Pershing 2s in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet leader, Mr Andropov, who failed to attend the central committee meeting, sent the Pope what must be regarded as a kind of peace message.

That was an unusual move made no doubt with an eye on Poland, although the Vatican will be represented as a state at the Stockholm conference.

The Pope has seen fit to offer his services as a mediator to take the edge off the East-West conflict and the dramatic turn, as he sees it, that ideological division of the world has taken.

He would also like to help stem the tide of fomenting hatred.

Neither Moscow nor Washington have yet responded to this offer, but the Kremlin leaders could take it up whenever they wanted.

Further developments may depend in part on the impression gained by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi on his visit to Bonn.

He will not have visited the Federal Republic at Moscow's express behest, but he will have sounded out the earnest of Bonn's continued readiness to come to terms and briefed the Kremlin on his impressions.

A personal message from Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl will since have arrived at the Kremlin, too.

At the present stage of proceedings Moscow will be reviewing Soviet security interests with due regard for requirements.

But the West shows no signs of fear, while Western Europeans are in no way either more aggressive or increasingly hostile.

The East Bloc, in contrast, seems to be threatened more by domestic than external destabilisation. So Moscow seems sure to return to the conference table.

Starting points for talks are already being set up, with *Tass* claiming that the new cruise missiles Nato is to deploy in southern Italy will threaten not only the East Bloc and the Soviet Union but also large areas of Africa.

The implication is that comprehensive disarmament talks are needed to avert this threat.

Josef Piaskowsky

(Nordwest Zeitung, 27 December 1983)

Gromyko to go to Stockholm conference

Lübecker Nachrichten

As the Old Year drew to a close the good news reached Bonn from Moscow that Mr Gromyko would be attending the opening of the 35-nation Stockholm conference in January.

America and Canada will also be taking part in the All-European Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament.

The Soviet Foreign Minister in Stockholm will be resuming the East-West security dialogue the Kremlin brought to a halt by breaking off the Geneva talks.

A particularly important point is that Mr Gromyko will meet US Secretary of State Shultz in the Swedish capital.

Continuation of the East-West dialogue is in both sides' interest.

If the Soviet Union had merely sent a minor official to Stockholm, as some in the West had feared, not only the Stockholm conference would have been worthless.

Moscow would have laid itself open generally to charges of not being sufficiently keen on peace.

So the new-look European security conference attended by the entire East Bloc is extremely welcome, but it would be wise not to place too great hopes in it.

There are no signs of change in the Soviet position of strength, as the resolution approved by the Supreme Soviet has again shown.

But the West still lacks a joint negotiating concept for the conference, sad to say, even though both nuclear disarmament and confidence-building measures are at stake.

This is particularly regrettable as Moscow, it must be feared, will try to drive wedges into the Western alliance by other means now it has failed to prevent missile deployment by Nato.

Stockholm may be a ray of hope, but it is certainly not an inspiration or flash of light on the road to peace.

Werner Neumann

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 31 December 1983)

Superpowers and detente

Continued from page 1

is generally to impress the public and not the other side.

The Big Two have felt obliged to do so mainly by opposition to missile deployment in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Both sides have always been well aware that serious negotiations could only be held if Nato countries stood by the 1979 missiles-and-talks decision.

That was the one prerequisite. The other was a concept, and there still is none to go by.

"Detente," Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "is not a definition of international friendship but a strategy for relations between adversaries."

Pat solutions rather than strategies seem to have dominated debate, with Moscow and Washington banking on each other's readiness to make concessions, while the peace movement recommended unilateral prior concessions.

The superpowers disregarded the fact that agreement can only be reached when the terms to justice to the security interests of both sides.

The peace movement failed to appreciate that unilateral prior concessions are generally regarded by the other side as a sign of weakness and not as an example to be followed.

If the West is to make peace safer in the year ahead it must draw up a balance sheet and bear in mind the lessons to be learnt from 1983.

First, there can be no arms control without a detente strategy. As long as the political perspective of cooperation is missing neither side will be prepared to seriously meet the other half-way in the arms sector.

Second, detente cannot prosper unless security policy is backed by public opinion.

Third, we will probably have to start from scratch again. The parts in a detente strategy will need to be reassembled. Small steps forward in East-West ties can help to reaccustom the two sides to cooperation.

Only the superpowers can reactivate detente. This realisation may come as a disappointment to Europeans in East and West.

But contacts between the two German states and talks between smaller powers on either side of the dividing line between East and West in Europe prove a point.

They show that missile deployment has not closed the door to East-West ties for good.

The best that can happen is that European countries will roll out the carpet on which the superpowers head toward each other.

The worst would be if they were to feed illusions that intensify mistrust between Moscow and Washington. There will certainly be no such thing as an island of detente in Europe.

Christoph Bertram

(Die Zeit, 30 December 1983)

UN is not to blame for the tough going

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

The 38th UN General Assembly, now in its Christmas recess after three months in session, coincided with critical international developments.

They began with the shooting-down of a South Korean airliner by the Soviet Union. The adjournment was overshadowed by the breakdown of disarmament talks between the superpowers.

The General Assembly passed 65 resolutions on disarmament without making much headway on the subject.

It could hardly be expected to do so as long as the superpowers persisted in their policy of confrontation and sought to outstrip each other in arms technology.

The UN is not to blame; it has neither legal nor military means of enforcing its resolutions except when the great powers are agreed on joint action in one crisis area or another.

As a rule the superpowers tend to use their Security Council veto to avert unpleasant accusations. Their view of crisis management amounts mainly to a bid to muscle the other side out of a crisis zone rather than so seek cooperation with it.

Cooperation is a tall order inasmuch as the fireman ready to rush to the scene is at times seen to have been the fire-raiser in the first place.

This being so, the UN General Assembly has still done useful work as a forum where world affairs can be raised and discussed in public.

The shooting-down of the Korean airliner by Soviet fighters, the American landing on Grenada, the massacres and terrorist raids in Lebanon, the proclamation of a Turkish Cypriot state and the breakdown of disarmament talks in Geneva and Vienna by the Soviet Union are but a handful of the latest crises discussed and still under discussion at the UN.

The United Nations cannot take decisive action unless the superpowers agree to cooperate, but it can inform and reduce aggression and confrontation by means of an exchange of arguments.

In spite of its inadequacies and shortcomings the UN amounts to something resembling the world's conscience. None of the great powers is seriously considering withdrawing from a body that has so often been declared dead and buried.

That alone is a sign of hope for the future.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 23 December 1983)

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■ EUROPE

New ideas are needed over the Washington relationship

DIE ZEIT

European-American disagreement is too acute for cosmetic treatment. What the partnership needs is a thorough therapy.

The symptoms of disagreement mounted during last year. The Europeans shook their heads over America's invasion of Grenada and its military involvement in Lebanon. They deplored Washington's harsh tone towards Moscow and the arms buildup.

The Americans were annoyed by the mass demonstrations against the deployment of new missiles in Europe and by Europe's lack of gumption, its babel of voices.

The dissension is fundamental. A look at the respective political barometers says something about the reasons.

America is governed by a mood of determination and a new self confidence. The mood in Europe is of self-doubt and timid emancipation.

Storms are inevitable when the two meet: shaping East-West relations, boosting the defence effort for example. They are increasingly also triggered by such economic issues as export quotas for European steel or American animal feed.

Similar European-American conflicts have occurred the time and again since the end of World War II because the aims and interests of the two sides have never been quite identical.

What did change last year and is likely to add a new element of strain is the tone of the dispute. It has never been so harsh.

Muscle-flexing Americans attack what they call Europe's selfishness. They wave the big stick of isolationism.

The chants of Europe's peace demonstrators are marked not only by fear of missiles and anger over the Americans but also by a longing for some neutral niche between the superpowers.

The battle cries on both sides of the Atlantic disregard one thing that has always been important in this partnership: the certainty of mutual dependence.

Neither inflammatory speeches nor pointing to the Soviet peril can bring about a new awareness of this mutual dependence that was once taken for granted.

Just as the superpowers at the disarmament bargaining table cannot reach common ground without creating a basis of political faith, so European-American consensus on security policy alone cannot forge ties between the New and the Old Worlds.

Additional common ground is needed if cooperation within the West is to be revitalised. This includes a consensus on foreign policy priorities, a coordinated attitude towards the Third World and a binding definition of roles in the stiffening competition in world trade.

Western Europe contributed little more than criticism to the transatlantic dialogue last year. The West European countries are too preoccupied with their own problems and interests. Their word carries little weight even when they speak with one voice.

True, the European Community managed to stop Washington from walking out on the CSCE process. But the Ten lacked the strength to bring the superpowers to their senses and force them to arrive at an arms control agreement.

As long as cacophony rather than harmony reigns in the Community it will be unable to exert any lasting influence.

Is Europe still John F. Kennedy's vaunted second pillar of the Alliance or indeed a new area of commonsense between the superpowers?

So far, no. Attempts to achieve this by being meek towards America and rubbing shoulders with the Soviet Union are likely to fail badly.

But the Americans also have no reason to be smug. When they hailed the start of the missile deployment towards the end of 1983 as proof of their leadership they overlooked the fact that American authority is being eroded — that is, an authority that rests on respect by the Allies rather than on missiles.

It is up to Washington to restore this respect through a carefully weighed foreign policy; and it is up to the Europeans to put courageous initiative in place of nagging self-pity.

Only then will the era of estrangement in European-American relations end. But only incorrigible optimists can see this happening in 1984.

Dieter Buhl

(Die Zeit, 30 December 1983)

Sanctions on Soviet trade quietly lifted

Handelsblatt
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZZEITUNG

The EEC has ended economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The decision, just before Christmas, was not publicised. With reason.

The sanctions, originally intended as a sort of punishment against Moscow after martial law was imposed in Poland in December 1981, never really deserved the name.

The original idea was to cut Soviet exports to the Community by more than DM1bn a year.

But EEC member countries could not agree on how.

In business with the Soviet Union, members are more concerned with their own advantage than with solidarity.

In the end, the boycott list contained some 60 items, including caviar, furs, pianos, carpets and refrigerators.

The total loss to the Soviet export business amounted to a meagre DM380m a year — 1.4 per cent of its exports to the Community.

This made the term "punitive action" ridiculous. The true motivation is perhaps better summed up by the term protectionism.

It was embarrassing to watch the lobbying for an extension of the sanctions by those branches of business that profited from a competitor kept at bay.

The fact that the Brussels Commission says that the sanctions were lifted because they were no longer necessary is an admission of their ineffectiveness.

It was hardly necessary to introduce the sanctions in the first place just to learn this lesson.

There are plenty of examples of useless sanctions: against South Africa, the boycott list of the Arab states and, last but not least, the American grain embargo.

The fact that the EEC countries decided not to publish the lifting of the sanctions also makes sense when considering that imposing them in the first place was meant as a political signal.

An official announcement of the lifting would have been another signal. It would have been hard to explain — and only at Christmas time.

Ewald Stein

(Handelsblatt, 27 December 1983)

France sets sights on pulling the EEC to its feet

France is determined to pull the European Community out of the mire it fell into at the summit in Athens.

Paris intends to use all diplomatic channels and exert massive pressure on European institutions to put the Community back on its feet.

Its six-month presidency of the Council of Europe began on New Year's Day.

The finance and farm policy reform drafted at the June summit in Stuttgart, when Germany held the presidency, is to be made ready for adoption.

The new president of the Council of Ministers, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, has already had talks with Gaston Thorn, the president of the European Commission.

They charted the course for the next six months, during which time President Mitterrand will head two summit meetings, in Brussels and in Paris.

If there is any sign of an agreement, France is likely to insist that the Council of Europe conference scheduled for March be held in Paris.

The French are under some pressure to succeed because they want to end their presidency with "the rescue of Europe."

Their prime backers are the other five founder members of the Community (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg).

These countries say that another postponement of the reforms — until the second half of the year — is unlikely to lead to any success because the presidency will then rest with Ireland, not one of the strongest members.

Cheysson intends to announce the anxiously awaited programme for the French presidency at the first meeting of the European Parliament in Strasbourg in January.

With a view to the scond direct elections to the European Parliament in mid-June, the 434 Euro-MPs are pressing for progress. This would enable them to motivate the Community's 182 million voters during their brief campaign.

Not only in Athens but in the other nine Community capitals as well it is unanimously agreed that there is no alternative to the Community and the European unification process.

This was also underscored by the European Parliament after the disappointing report by Greek Prime Minister Papandreou.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's proposal that the Community's finance and farm problems be solved by the original six

Saarbrücker Zeitung

members has met with opposition frm the newcomers (Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Greece).

These four countries (there of which joined on 1 January 1973 and one, Greece, at the beginning of 1981) are determined not to be uncoupled.

A similar proposal made by Willy Brandt during his chancellorship was also turned down.

Even so, the original members uphold their charges that the newcomers lack the 1955 "spirit of Messina" that led to the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.

But despite France's intention to overcome the Community crisis as quickly as possible, it will be difficult to achieve this.

Under pressure from the nation's 2.2 million farmers, the Paris government is reluctant to introduce cutbacks in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), despite the high cost of surpluses.

France has denied that, during the Athens summit, it dropped its opposition to Spain and Portugal joining the EEC. It has also denied that it agreed that Germany need not waive its countervailing exchange rate levles (now 9.8 per cent).

What it boils down to is, In presenting the position as of the beginning of its presidency, France must expect a dual opposition from Germany.

For one thing, waiving the levies would cut German farm incomes by about 20 per cent; for another, the increase of the VAT transfer to Brussels from the present one per cent to 1.4 per cent would cost Bonn DM4bn.

Germany will not agree to a greater contribution to the EEC budget without a fixed date for the accession of Spain and Portugal.

Helmut J. Weiand

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 23 December 1983)

■ REFLECTIONS

The versatile world of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

The writer, Kurt Becker, was chief government spokesman in Bonn under Chancellor Schmidt from 1980 to 1982.

When he was Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt enjoyed more public support, regardless of party-political affiliations, than any Chancellor before him.

And his international standing with Germany's friends in Washington, Paris, Tokyo and major Third World capitals, was higher than any predecessor's.

A few years ago a majority of French people questioned said Helmut Schmidt would be their choice for head of state of a united Europe.

He still enjoys and inspires confidence and continues to outperform all comers in the popularity ratings of German politicians.

The difference is, of course, that he is now an ex-statesman. He may still be a valued international contact but he is no longer in power.

All he has to offer is the persuasive power of a keen mind and the experience of decades in politics and world affairs.

His status is that of an elder statesman, a man who is no longer concerned with day-to-day worries but whose views are given a respectful hearing in times of trouble.

Helmut Schmidt at 65 measures up to this yardstick. More is expected of an elder statesman than energy and experience, and he has more to offer.

He is at home in the world of philosophy and is on record as appreciating Immanuel Kant from the viewpoint of a holder of political responsibility.

Schmidt himself both in books and by the example he has set in practice has established standards of statesmanship and statecraft.

He is not just a bookworm; he is also a writer of political books. His major work is entitled The Strategy of Balance.

Audiences are fascinated when he outlines his ideas off the beaten track of day-to-day politics to listeners who may be architects or physicists, town planners or writers.

They are spellbound when he enunciates his views on basic values, striking a balance between temporal constitutional considerations and religious aspects.

Even at his busiest he has always found time to hold talks with the world's leading artists, men such as Bernstein or Karajan, and to talk knowledgeably about the arts with them.

He has recorded an LP as a concert pianist and is also — a lesser-known fact — a gifted amateur painter.

His importance as Chancellor was his combination, unusual among politicians, of three characteristics in equal measure.

The first is his talent for profound analytical penetration of a problem. He would work his way through piles of books and files, then discuss the issue with his closer associates, and ideas simply flashed to and fro.

The second is his ability to reach political conclusions from the analysis undertaken.

The third has always been his knack of doing what is needed and is possible. It was tiring and time-consuming work, but dialogue and debate were the only way to ensure the majority support he needed.

Schmidt knew from experience that he stood to derive enormous benefit from intelligent contradiction and advice given by people with minds of their own.

Their company was congenial to him, and people of this calibre made up his closest associates.

He also gained the affection and esteem of a large number of independent and knowledgeable people from all walks of life and of all political hues.

They were all undisputed specialists in their fields and their specialist advice was extremely valuable.

Helmut Schmidt had a reputation for being brusque with fellow-Social Democrats, but in dealings with people such as these he took in every word.

Much of his experience was naturally gained in his previous jobs as leader of the parliamentary party in Bonn, Defence Minister, Economic Affairs Minister and Finance Minister.

In over 20 years he had also built up a fund of expertise in foreign affairs and security policy, making personal acquaintances all over the world.

As an economist by training he was accustomed to thinking in terms of international economic considerations. He was also a gifted speaker.

Left-wing Social Democrats increasingly came to feel that he as a Chancellor who was often conservative in outlook lacked their own visions of change.

With the Liberals, his coalition partners, preparing to abandon ship too, his government was bound to fall in autumn 1982, as could hardly have been more clearly underlined than by the November 1983 SPD conference's rejection of deployment.

In security policy of all issues, a subject on which he was particularly well-informed, Helmut Schmidt has become an outsider in his own party.

Yet his reputation as statesman is undamaged. It was hard-earned and accompanied by many domestic setbacks.

His first task as Chancellor was to clip the wings of the urge to embark on costly reforms the country could no longer afford.

Oil price increases had ended hopes of constant economic growth, and when difficulties arose in connection with the pension funds his support plummeted.

In 1976 he was re-elected Chancellor by a majority of one. Yet a year later he finally earned the reputation of being a head of government with a safe and lucky knack of keeping his house in order.

Everyone was delighted by the determination he showed in fighting terrorism and freeing German hostages on board a hijacked Lufthansa airliner in Mogadishu.



Helmut Schmidt and wife Loki (Photo: Sven Simon)

He was such a a master of political decision-making, such a virtuoso at crisis management, that left-wing ideologists contemptuously dismissed him as an authoritarian technocrat.

They termed him a *Macher*, or man who gets things done, and it was not intended as a compliment.

It made him livid. He attached more importance to the moral basis of moves than to mere expertise. He fully agreed with Max Weber's ideal of a politician combining a sense of responsibility, political emotion and a sure and accurate eye.

He was pragmatic in outlook, not doctrinaire, having learnt from experience that you cannot govern without compromising.

They way in which he was ousted after eight and a half years in power was bitter. His own party was increasingly at loggerheads with him and steadily withdrew support for a Chancellor who advocated austerity and the Nato decision on missile deployment.

Many successful years were to follow. Even during the growing international economic crisis Germany fared better in comparison than its major partners and neighbours.

We owe Helmut Schmidt the domestic and social stability that reigned in the Federal Republic in this period.

Yet his main claim to fame is arguably as the architect of a long-term German foreign policy based on the groundwork laid by Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt.

While Helmut Schmidt was Chancellor, Bonn's international standing, confidence and importance increased to an extent no-one would have dared to forecast 10 years previously.

It took him to consolidate the Federal Republic's foreign policy status as a medium-sized European power and a nuclear have-not.

This self-restraint in terms of power politics enabled him to exert a constructive influence on all aspects of foreign, security and international economic policy.

It is considered a matter of course abroad, much more so than in Germany, that the Federal Republic has a say in world affairs as a medium-sized power politically but a great power economically.

Helmut Schmidt's philosophy of a balance of power at as low a level as possible, of arms limitation, dialogue and cooperation between East and West especially at times of crisis, has made its mark on international thinking and the language of diplomacy.

His foreign policy thinking included the view that we must never stand on our own but must always gain security and international influence in close partnership with others.

Being left to our devices was more than we could handle, and we were out on a limb, as so often in German history.

Today the Federal Republic is a highly respected partner in the Western alliance and the European Community and a highly rated partner in dialogue with the East.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and during the Polish crisis Helmut Schmidt was one of the most highly regarded spokesmen for the West.

Bonn's enhanced reputation had already been apparent at the 1979 Guadeloupe summit, where Herr Schmidt was one of four leaders at the meeting.

It has also been clear from Germany attending the annual Western economic summits of leading industrialised countries: gatherings at which he was a leading figure.

The assertion of German interests in Washington led to bellyaching in the US capital, but Schmidt always gave absolute priority to maintaining our relationship with the leading Western power.

Close political cooperation with France, especially while he and M. Giscard d'Estaing were in office, was seen as a major foreign policy achievement but never given more than second place.

Strong ties with the West enabled Bonn to gain greater leeway to the East, including the GDR, always based on the conviction that balance was essential and the Federal Republic must not be to blame for any extra tension.

This policy is in keeping with what the overwhelming majority of Germans want, and there has been continuity despite the change of Chancellor.

Our standing in the world today, as a country that is stable, predictable and reliable, is the work of Helmut Schmidt. He is one of the great German Chancellors of the century.

Kurt Becker

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 23 December 1983)

Israeli recital

Helmut Schmidt, who as Chancellor shelved a visit to Israel because of clashes with Premier Begin, is to give a performance in Jerusalem next May as a concert pianist.

The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra has confirmed that the former Chancellor has agreed to take part in a concert to be held on the eve of Israel's 36th independence anniversary.

He will be one of the pianists in a performance of Johann Sebastian Bach's Concerto for Four Pianos conducted by Leonard Bernstein.

Violinust Yehudi Menuhin is also expected to take part in the concert.

dpa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 28 December 1983)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Franco-German talks centre on national identity

Germany and Europe: Questions of National Identity was the subject of the 11th round of Franco-German talks in the Reichstag in Berlin.

The gathering, attended by publicists and politicians from both countries, was held by the Deutsch-Französisches Institut, Ludwigsburg, and aided by a grant from the Robert Bosch Foundation.

Difficulties were by no means limited to the days when the two countries were arch-enemies. They have also bedevilled relations over the past 20 years.

In spite of the Franco-German friendship treaty, reconciliation and official protestations of amity, prejudices of old reappear whenever clashes occur between French and German interests.

Misunderstandings, failure to understand each other, and irritation seem to go deeper this time than they usually have done.

The missiles debate, the peace movement and militant opposition to new airport runways and nuclear power stations have given rise to uncertainty in France.

So have the policies pursued by the Greens, whom the French suspect of basically right-wing blood-and-soil sentiments.

The French are worried again, and to an alarming degree, about what they see as *incertitudes allemandes*, or German vacillation.

Feeling a rational approach to be a national virtue, the French view peace movement protest as coming straight out of the German backwoods.

They have visions of a resurgence of German irrationalism, this time wearing jeans. They see the peace movement's mass rallies as signs of a new German collectivism that worries the pastm just as German march-pasts in the past worried them.

They see German pacifism as faint-hearted self-abandonment and German protest against the stationing of Pershing 2s as neutralism with a nationalist tinge.

French pundits feel the Federal Republic is threatening to drift out of the Western alliance.

"I have seldom had to swim against the tide of such a strong current of misunderstanding in both countries," the French specialist on German affairs Alfred Grosser recently told *Der Spiegel*, the Hamburg newsweekly.

The highly-rated Ludwigsburg institute felt it was time something was done to counteract confusion and misunderstanding.

It sees its role as that of keeping an expert eye on sentiment in both countries, of influencing the public and its opinion-makers, of stimulating debate and of providing information as a means of rectifying a disturbed relationship.

Germany's role in Europe and issues of national identity is a subject that a few years ago would have been considered to be somewhat off the beaten track.

But it clearly reflected the tenor of the current debate in France. Germans and French agreed in Berlin that growing anti-Americanism and the tendency toward neutralism in part of the peace movement were evidence of a quest for national identity.

If missile deployment had not been available as an issue, Erlangen historian Michael Stürmer said, the debate on nation and state, German interests and the Germans' role in the heart of Europe would have been triggered by something else.

The French are indeed confronted with a confusing picture that throws accustomed thought patterns into total disarray.

The Federal Republic, which in French eyes used to be a model of political consensus, has since last autumn been split into opponents and supporters of missile deployment.

The French, who are normally at party-political loggerheads with each other, are agreed on national defence policy and President Mitterrand's approval of deployment.

The French view unrest and disunity in Germans as confusing and unaccustomed; the Germans are no less confused and unaccustomed to the unanimity shown by French people of entirely different origins.

What the French are agreed on is their feeling of uneasiness about what has been dubbed the German disease: German unpredictability and the revival of nationalism or national pacifism.

The questions asked by French participants were surprising in their similarity given their widely differing political viewpoints.

There was Jean Ellenstein, the Marxists theoretician and former leading Communist, and Socialist left-winger Jean-Pierre Chevènement.

There was André Fontaine, the editor of *Le Monde*, and Jean François Revel, the columnist of the right-wing weekly *L'Express*.

André Glucksmann, France's heretical master-thinker of the 1968 generation, a left-wing critic of Marxism and harbinger of change in the Paris intellectual scene, threw established ideas of both Left and Right into confusion.

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

He asked provocative questions that became something of a leitmotif of the gathering. "Do you want to defend yourselves or to surrender?" he asked, and: "How do you feel about democracy?"

For the French these are questions inextricably interlinked. Glucksmann said the German peace movement pointedly ignored the Eastern threat, was disinclined to defend itself and wanted to leave its defence to its allies.

Its hallmarks were refusal, renunciation and a desire to join out of modern history and ties with the West.

Sooner Red than dead was a slogan that expressed this viewpoint, a view that proposed giving up rights to democracy and freedom and submitting to slavery of any kind in return for vague hopes of physical survival.

The survival of democracy and of Western civilisation, based on freedom and human rights, and the prevention of a fresh Auschwitz were only possible if one was prepared to sell one's life as dearly as possible.

The external threat justified the deterrent as a counter-threat, he said. In common with so many French intellectuals, Glucksmann has been late to discover the Gulag Archipelago, but he has taken the point.

How serious, he also asks, are the Germans about democracy when they are so readily prepared to give it up?

André Fontaine sounded a similar note, as did Joseph Rovan, one of the earliest advocates of Fran:o-German reconciliation, and other French journalists and academics.

They suspected that in the final analysis the German peace movement wanted to revoke the historic decision to make the new German state a Western-style democracy and to incorporate it in the North Atlantic pact.

The French, and not just the French, are understandably alarmed at the prospect of a seeming risk of Germany's young democracy backsliding from these ties that count so heavily toward stability and security in Europe.

French and German speakers gave different explanations why such a wide-ranging peace movement had arisen in Germany while the French were strongly in favour of the French nuclear deterrent.

The two countries were said to have undergone different historical experiences in the course of their joint history.

In France the trauma of the 1938 Munich Agreement, of 1930s appeasement and defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1940 was still at work.

The lesson the French had learnt from history was that past mistakes must not be repeated and democracy and freedom had to be defended.

German experience, in contrast, had been marked by Wilhelminian militarism and National Socialism, which had brought war and destruction on Europe.

Never again, all Germans were fundamentally agreed, must war break out from German soil.

Glucksmann made a provocative historical and psychological interpretation of the German peace movement in claiming that:

"The Germans, burdened with the guilt of Auschwitz, want to switch from the role of the evil-doer to the role of the victim. They see themselves as the Jews of the Third World War."

In terms of intellectual history Professor Rudolf von Thadden, Göttingen, attributed the emotional and religious character of the new German pacifism to the influence of Protestantism.

The Protestant Church, which had used to be on the side of the authoritarian state, was now open to the world at large.

It combined pietistic *Weltangst*, or fear for the world, and a Christian longing for peace. In Germany, unlike in France, the debate on God and the world was a matter of values and beliefs.

The part played by the nation in Germany provided another model on which an explanation might by based. After the crimes committed by the Nazis and the collapse of the Third Reich national ideas had been discredited in 1945.

Germans in East and West identified with economic reconstruction, hard work, prosperity and consumption as a kind of *ersatz* patriotism.

But the international economic crisis and unemployment, the destruction of the environment and intellectual decline resulting from thinking solely in terms of consumption had shattered the old *ersatz* values of the post-war period.

The younger generation, hit hardest by unemployment and with no prospects for the future, was in revolt against the materialism and meaningless lives of its parents.

The conflict between generations went deeper in Protestant Germany, Stürmer said.

Professor Werner Weidenfeld, Mainz, even felt there was a "rogue urge to identify" among young Germans.

Political scientist Gerhard Kiersch arrived at similar conclusions. He held an extremely well-attended seminar on The National Issue at the Free University in West Berlin.

Rejection of affluence-orientated consumer society by the "alternative" student generation led to a rejection of the way of life in Western industrial society as practised primarily by the Americans.

Professor Kiersch quoted extracts from seminar papers that were typical of the anti-American and anti-Western sentimehts of his students.

His quotations merely confirmed the fears voiced by the French. "The Germans," one quotation reads, "will one day be grateful for the division of the country after the Second World War for having kept part of Germany free from Western influence."

Groups of young Germans who hold such views and are fascinated by the idea of being German no longer felt it was a matter of course that the Federal Republic formed part of the West.

The old idea that Germany might be better suited as a country midway between East and West had been resurrected. The peace movement and opposition to American missiles were a kind of *ersatz* patriotism in this context.

These situation reports from German universities, with Berlin being no exception to the rule, were unlikely to soothe the savaged brows of French participants.

An attempt was made to relativise them by Philipp Jenninger, the Minister of State at the Chancellor's Office in charge of Franco-German relations.

Neither he nor former chief government spokesman Klaus Bölling saw any signs of the reunification euphoria some French speakers felt they had come across. "The Federal government's *Deutschlandpolitik* serves the sole purpose of making division as bearable as possible," he said.

Professor Richard Löwenthal went further: "The unification of Europe, including the Poles, in a free Western civilisation ought to be our long-term political objective, and not a unified German nation-state that would continue to give rise to anxiety among neighbouring countries."

This was very much to the point for the French, who are worried by the revival of national thinking in Germany and show keener interest in Europe as a consequence.

Mysterious Germany, they argued, must be even more closely bound to the community of democratic states, and the European Community must be strengthened.

André Fontaine even went so far as to call for a European defence community.

Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Alfred Grosser preferred to look ahead, averting their gaze from contemplation of Germany's navel and concentrating on the technological and economic challenges that lay ahead.

If the European Community was not to solve its internal problems soon, if Germans and French were not to join forces in responsibility for Europe and if Europe was not to catch up with the Americans and Japanese in technologies that held the key to the future, then the future of all European nation-states would be so grim that there would no longer be any point in discussing issues of national identity, they said.

Thomas Gack

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 24 December 1983)

■ BUSINESS

Tax exemption dropped: Flick must pay up

Süddeutsche Zeitung

A decision to grant tax exemptions worth 450 million marks to the Flick industrial group between 1976 and 1978 has been reversed.

According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, there are doubts about the information supplied at the time of the application.

The exemption involved cash Flick made from a sale of Daimler Benz stock which was subsequently invested in the American firm of W. R. Grace & Co.

Exemption can be made when certain types of deals are considered to be of benefit to the national economy.

The Ministry decided to reverse its decision after an investigation lasting a year. It says that the assumptions on which the exemption decision were based were unsound.

The Ministry also now says that at the time the exemption certificates were issued, there was no reason to doubt the accuracy of the information.

Here, the Ministry is on thin ice: doubts about the benefit to the economy were mentioned.

For example, the Finance Ministry said so at senior levels. This is shown in notes made by Flick executives during proceedings considering the matter.

It was the discovery of these notes that prompted the public prosecutor to investigate the affair.

Some Opposition Social Democrats, including Dr Dieter Spöri, and a number of journalists publicly voiced doubts as far back as 1978.

Another flaw from the very beginning was soon in the fact that the tax exemption favoured a stockmarket deal.

Flick's block of Grace stock is now worth almost twice its purchase price.

The whole thing could snowball and call into question another Flick equity that received tax relief, the stake in the holding company set up by Germany's industry in a bail-out operation for the Gerling concern. Here, too, senior Ministry officials voiced reservations.

So the lifting of the tax exemptions for the Grace deal does not put an end to the Flick issue.

Flick is unlikely to pay close to half a billion deutschemarks without a legal battle.

The courts will have to assess whether Flick suffered financial damage by relying on the validity of the exemptions.

Under German procedural laws, however, Flick cannot claim such damage if it obtained the exemptions through incorrect information or "deliberate deception, threats or pay-offs."

Martin E. Süskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 December 1983)

The role of Daimler Benz stock in the affair

DIE WELT

Friedrich Karl Flick decided in 1974-75 to reduce the family holding in Daimler Benz from 39 to ten per cent.

Flick is the owner of Germany's largest family business with annual sales of about DM25bn. The shares in Daimler Benz had been amassed by his father. But the decision to sell was prompted by attractive bids by the oil sheikhs.

They wanted a stake in one of Germany's most prestigeous companies.

To prevent the stock going out of the country, Deutsche Bank stepped in and bought most of the block through its Mercedes Automobil Holding, a company specially set up for the purpose. The shares were later made available to the public.

Flick collected more than DM2bn of which DM1.9bn was chalked up as a book profit on the low purchase price paid by his father.

The heirs' reason for selling was that capital gains taxes on the steeply rising Daimler Benz stock were eating up most of the dividends.

The idea was to invest the proceeds in something that would improve the structure and the international involvement of the family business.

Like others, Flick wanted to channel most of his book profits past the 56 per cent corporate tax bite when re-investing.

He was partly successful: some DM435m went into the Flick group's major domestic subsidiaries. This resulted in 1,000 new jobs and tax exemption. Another tax exempt DM210m went into obtaining a slim majority in the Gerling Insurance Group. Other attempts failed.

Flick's tax exemption for the DM820m that went into the equity of the American W. R. Grace & Co. has now been revoked. This means a tax burden of DM460m.

About DM1bn of the book profit made with the Daimler Benz deal would go to the tax man.

It Flick shared the profits from the Daimler Benz deal with the tax department instead of re-investing in "an equity beneficial to the national economy" and so earning tax exemption, he would have been better off.

He could have invested the money in America. High interest rates and a 5 per cent higher dollar exchange rate would have left him with the whole of the Daimler Benz deal proceeds intact.

Still, the tax bite on the Grace deal is unlikely to shake the Flick Group.


The ten per cent Daimler Benz equity still held by the group now has a market value equal to the 29 per cent sold in 1974/75.


A sale of this ten per cent would mark the beginning of the second act of the farce. But it is unlikely that it would end with an investment in German jobs.

Joachim Gehlhoff

(Die Welt, 28 December 1983)

Three of 590,000 WELT readers.





New York's Grace & Co and the Flick connection

The Flick Holding Group has been lucky in its American share deals — at least with stockmarket prices, exchanges rates and purchase prices.

But commercial and research cooperation between W. R. Grace & Co., New York, and Flick has been modest. There are only three Flick people on the 31-man Grace board. Yet Flick, with about 28 per cent of the Grace stock, is the only large stockholder.

Head of the American concern with its interests in chemicals, energy, raw materials, retailing and catering, is Peter Grace, 70.

He has only one per cent in the company but he rules it like a feudal lord.

Business cooperation between the two groups focuses on the chemical sector.

Grace is one of the most important American makers of special chemicals and Flick has a stake in both Feldmühle and Dynamit Nobel.

Flick and Grace have set up two companies to investigate the market prospects for super-pure silicone and ceramics for use in the motor industry. Each has 50 per cent.

The development of Grace operating profits has been no source of joy for Flick.

The most profitable of the operation in previous years, energy and raw materials, have been hard hit by declining demand and falling oil prices.

Net profits in the first nine months of 1983 were down by 62 per cent to $102m. But the year before the company chalked up extra profits worth $65m through the sale of a subsidiary.

The three other major areas of operation — special chemicals, retailing and restaurants — managed to increase profits. Sales stagnated at around $4.5bn.

Even so, the investment in Grace has paid off for Flick. In 1976, Flick bought four million Grace shares at $26. This was boosted in 1978 by the purchase of another 7.3 million shares at $35.

It has continued to buy Grace stock with every new issue to maintain its level of equity.

The total cost of the Flick equity is estimated at less than $450m. But, assuming a current quotation of $44.125 per share, today's market value of the stock is about $600m or DM1.65bn.

US stock exchange insiders say that due to favourable exchange rates in 1976 and 1978, the total cost to Flick was about DM900m.

The same applies to Flick's equity in US Filter Corp. Flick bought a 35 per cent equity for about $100m in 1979. The block of stock was sold in 1981 to the Ashland Oil Co. for $129m. Estimated profit: just under 50 per cent.

It Flick decides to sell, its Grace stock would be worth more much more than its stockmarket price because the 28 per cent equity would be particularly interesting in a possible take-over bid. Up to 30 per cent over market price is no rarity in such cases.

This is further enchanced by high dividends. But the Flick Group seems to have no intention of selling its Grace holding.

dpa/vwd

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 29 December 1983)

■ BUSINESS

Prospects much better for bailed-out AEG

The most expensive settlement of a company's debts with its creditors in post-war German history looks like coming to an unexpectedly satisfactory conclusion in the New Year.

It is the tale of AEG-Telefunken, a company that narrowly survived to become a centenarian in 1983 and was subjected in the biggest commercial rescue bid ever staged to bail out a German firm.

In 1984 losses will be down to virtually zero, and although the payroll has been almost halved in relation to 1978, the company is in much better condition than almost anyone would have forecast a year ago.

In 1982 the operating losses were DM932m. In 1983 AEG's losses are reported to have been cut back by nearly DM900m.

The company will still be settling with its creditors until September 1984, but for 1983 it will need to draw on only DM50m of the DM100m in reserves it was expected to have to write off against operating losses.

In the year ahead the management are confident the company can run at a profit in terms of current business.

Only DM600m of the DM2.2bn Wilhelm Schaaf, the lawyer in charge of the rescue bid, was allowed as a credit line has been used.

Trading by what is left of AEG, mainly household equipment, capital goods, ordnance and business machinery, has overcome the shock of the company almost having gone to the wall.

Despite better earnings and an encouraging cash flow arising from the settlement terms, stock market analysts of Frankfurt banks are chary of making forecasts about AEG's stock market quotation.

AEG shares are currently quoted at roughly DM80, but pundits say this already takes into account hopes of a better future.

According to an investment subsidiary of Deutsche Bank, AEG is likely to perform fairly well in the short term. But interest payments on accumulated debts are soon to be resumed.

The company's debts were cut to 40 per cent by the terms of the settlement, but interest payments on what is left will be due again from next September.

Bankers say interest payments will amount to about DM150m a year. So AEG will need to earn that much more before it can be regarded as a blue chip again.

The interest waiver during settlement proceedings is probably why chief executive *Heinz Dürr, Herr Schaaf and* consultant Klaus Kuhn are biding their time until September.

They might, from the liquidity viewpoint, be in a position to resume debt funding earlier, but why do so?

The company's financial position has been substantially eased for years to come by the decision of a company pensions consortium to underwrite 60 per cent of AEG company pensions for 1983.

That, one analyst says, has given the balance sheet an entirely new look. But it will still be several years before a dividend can be paid.

AEG will first have to net a profit, and back taxes totalling up to DM150m must first be paid.

The company still stands to net an extraordinary payment in compensation for the stakes in its telecom subsidiary ATN (now ANT) taken over by Mannesmann, Bosch and Allianz.

But investment analysts note that structural expenditure cost the company roughly DM200m in 1983.

The bulk of the DM943m it has cost to put the company back on an even keel was written off in 1982. Overall losses total nearly DM2bn.

On the credit side of the balance sheet AEG recouped nearly DM2bn from the 60 per cent of claims creditors agreed to write off by the terms of the settlement.

At the end of 1983 AEG is an electrical engineering group that still employs a world payroll of 76,500 (as against 87,200 a year ago and about 130,000 in 1978).

About 15 per cent of the decline resulted from redundancy agreements, the remainder from the sale of subsidiaries.

Group turnover will have totalled well over DM11.5bn, or a little more than in 1982.

AEG's household equipment division and Olympia, the office equipment subsidiary, are still in the red, but the over 50 per cent of AEG turnover in the industrial equipment sector (in the widest sense of the term) is earning profits.

Wieland Schmitz-rtr

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 December 1983)

Allianz loses Eagle Star takeover bid to BAT

Allianz, Germany's largest insurance group, has given up its bid to win control of Eagle Star, the large British insurance group. A rival bidder, BAT Industries, has agreed to pay 700 pence for enough shares to take control. The takeover battle has been running for two months. Under the deal, Allianz is to sell its 30 per cent Eagle Star holding (42 million shares) to BAT. It would make a profit of about £ 165 million (about DM650m).

Wolfgang Schieren, the chief executive of the huge Munich-based insurance group, Allianz, is heavily involved in the politics of doing business world wide.

Schieren forced the way open for a major foreign operation as soon as he moved into his job at the top.

Allianz, the biggest insurance group in continental Europe, moved into direct insurance in America, at first with a subsidiary in Los Angeles.

The business, dealing with property, ran well. But Schieren was not satisfied. Three years later, in 1979, Allianz launched a massive operation in America.

Schieren announced proudly: "We're the only direct German insurer with the drive to take on the American market."

The Allianz Insurance Company in Los Angeles soon spread its business to other cities. At the same time it moved into life insurance.

But it wanted the work to come in big chunks, not in dribs and drabs. The aim was to take over existing business.

So Allianz paid the then respectable sum of 140 million dollars for North American Life and Casualty, Minneapolis. The annual premium income was only 73 million dollars.

It forked out even more for another medium-sized company, Fidelity Union Life, in Dallas, 370 million dollars compared with an annual premium volume of 91 million dollars.

In total, the Munich group had paid out more than 900 million marks for the two American companies, more than double its entire share capital.

The insurance industry regarded this as too expensive. The financial risks were too great.

Schieren answered briefly: "We're not buying turnover. We're buying profit." And long-term yield, he said, was not in doubt. Certainly there was talk about a yield of seven per cent at the time of purchase.

Although Allianz reckoned the risks were reasonable, it spread the risk to its sister firm, Münchener Rückversicherung-Gesellschaft. That, in turn, took a 25 per cent stake in the newly founded US-Holding Allianz.

A few other companies also took small interests and Allianz itself stayed with a bare 52 per cent.

Schieren was not slow in talking about the benefits that would come. But the field of life insurance is fraught with pitfalls. Sometimes things have to be learned the expensive way.

In this case, the problems were with Fidelity. It was the time of high interest rates. Policy holders took advantage of this by taking out low-interest loans against their policies and putting the money into highly profitable investments.

But the group's total foreign premium volume grew in nine years up to last year from 150 million marks to over 2 billion marks.

At the same time the foreign proportion of the total property and life business increased from 2.4 per cent to 14.7 per cent.

Schieren had not finished. So he began with the big British group, Eagle Star. He also showed interest in Swiss and Japanese companies.

Unfortunately, said Schieren, Swiss firms presented a particular problem as the major stockholders were not often prepared to sell.

Allianz's profitability over the past few years has not been damaged by its foreign interests. Development, in contrast to most of the competition, has been excellent and profits have been high.

In 1983 it made 129 million marks, more than double the 1982 figure. It earns well on its investments. And it constantly returns 20 per cent in dividends.

In 1982 its capital was increased by 83 million marks to 500 million.

Schieren also says that the customers are treated generously: "I would rather be accused of all sorts of things than give the customers bad service."

Hermann Bössenecker

(Die Zeit, 16 December 1983)

Management slated over collapse of construction plant maker

Sloppy management was one reason for the collapse of the huge construction machinery maker, IBH. Company documents reveal the extent of counter-productive practices.

One memo said that marketing laissez-faire had to end. It was only leading to expensive competition between various parts of the company.

These revelations are in sharp contrast to the public utterances of the whizz-kid then at the head of IBH, Horst-Dieter Esch.

He said that the group ran a powerfully, centrally operated sales organisation.

Yet a board meeting in June 1983 was told that business trips abroad were not coordinated and were costing the company a lot of money.

Esch sought to reduce the risks inherent in the building machine industry because of fluctuations in trade through geographical diversification and by taking over foreign factories.

This, according to one analysis, was the beginning of the end.

For example, the takeover of Hymac, in Britain, was at no stage necessary in commercial terms.

Another example was the French group. It stayed in the red following its takeover. *The risks involved in its acquisition bore no relation to the profit potential.*

In addition, the acquisition from General Motors of Terex, proved to be an expensive failure. The firm was confident that without Terex, it could have survived. But at the beginning of 1983 it was realised that survival depended on solving the problems there.

"Selling Terex was a happy day for General Motors," says the analysis.

Terex had production facilities in America, Brazil and Scotland. General Motors retained a 19.6 per cent interest in it. Esch had hoped that, because of its financial muscle, the motor manufacturer would put in some badly needed capital.

It did not. This led to Esch's resignation and eventually to the firm's bankruptcy.

The analysis says that serious deficiencies were also apparent in the group's management. It appeared that, just like in the successful early days, it was still being run like a private firm.

Esch is said to have taken solitary decisions. Fellow executives learned of these only by accident or through rumour. An example was what was happening at Terex.

Personal policies come under criticism. Esch's habit of sacking entire managements of newly acquired firms and replacing them with middle-level employees appeared not to have worked.

There were, in any case, many staff problems. Important positions were either not filled or filled inadequately.

And the marketing organisation was described in the report as being like "a kindergarten with the one-eyed leading the blind."

The technical rationalisation was not much better. "In all works, there was out-of-date machinery. New investment should not consist merely of buildings."

An example was the Zettelmeyer factory in Konz, a highly modern building. Break-even point was at a turnover of about DM250m a year, but in 1982, only about DM140m worth of machinery was produced.

This led management to consider shifting Hamm, Duomat and Lanz to Zettelmeyer and Hanomag, in Hanover. It also thought about closing down the British Hymac plant or shifting its production to the Scottish division of Terex.

But these measures were not carried out, although they might have eliminated duplication and reduced over-production.

(Handelsblatt, 27 December 1983)

■ SOCIETY

Trade union investigation reveals the lot of those caught in the poverty trap

People who no longer qualify for unemployment benefit sooner or later have to apply for social security, running the risk of other members of the family being required to support them.

These other family members could be parents; they could also be children. It is embarrassing, humiliating and a poverty trap that really hurts.

Heinz, a 52-year-old unemployed construction worker, is one of those who are no longer able to feed their families.

The realisation, he says, hit him like a sledgehammer. He has stomach pains. His nerves are in tatters. He is ashamed to look his neighbours in the face.

He has been out of work for two years and feels "like a beggar," especially as regards his 23-year-old son, who now has to help the family out financially.

A recent report by the European *Community Commission* shows that even in highly industrialised countries unemployment can mark the gateway to poverty.

The claim is fleshed out by a survey undertaken by four Cologne sociologists for the Hans Böckler Foundation, a research wing of the DGB, Germany's Düsseldorf-based trades union confederation.

It is entitled The New Poverty: The Unemployed Who No Longer Qualify For Unemployment Benefit. Heinz, 52, is one of the case histories dealt with.

He had paid contributions toward unemployment insurance for decades, but only qualified for full unemployment benefit for a year, that being the legal limit.

He then applied for unemployment assistance, which differs from benefit in two ways, the first being that it is less (58 per cent of the applicant's last take-home pay, as against 68 per cent when he drew it).

The other difference is that the labour exchange only approves payments to those who qualify as genuinely needy; in other words, there is a means test.

If an unemployed person's husband or wife is still a breadwinner, these earnings are deducted from unemployment assistance (except for a weekly DM75 for the husband or wife and DM35 per child).

By these criteria Heinz's wife earns too much and he qualifies for nothing. In a mere year the family was reduced to little more than a third of what it had been earning.

Husband and wife together used to net DM3,479 a month. Now they are reduced to her take-home pay, which is DM1,279 a month.

About 28 per cent, or 506,000, of the 1.8m registered unemployed in September 1982 are estimated by the Federal Labour Office not to have drawn unemployment assistance.

More recent figures are not yet available. The September 1982 figure was a threefold increase on May 1975.

Higher unemployment is one reason for the increase. Another is that family and children's allowances for unemployment assistance have not been increased since the scheme was launched in 1969.

The authors of the DGB report say *these allowances are a* particularly serious blow to the family. Married applicants for unemployment assistance are mainly caught in this poverty trap.

The number of people who are out of work but no longer qualify for unemployment benefit is steadily increasing, mainly because the authorities are constantly amending the regulations.

The 1984 budget is a case in point. One of its provisions is that childless couples whose breadwinner signs on as unemployed will only qualify for 63 per cent of his or her last take-home pay (as against 68 per cent at the time of writing).

The first series of major cuts in unemployment benefits formed part of the January 1982 Employment Promotion Consolidation Act.

To qualify for unemployment benefit you have since had to have paid 12 monthly unemployment insurance contributions over the past three years; it was previously six contributions.

Since January 1983 the length of time benefit is payable has been reduced: from one year's dole for two years' contributions to eight months.

In other words, to qualify for the maximum benefit duration of 12 months you now have to have been in employment and paid contributions for three years instead of two.

The number of registered unemployed who went empty-handed as a result of the 1982 Act nominally increased from 26 to 28 per cent.

But the authors of the report are convinced there has been a much larger increase in the number of dropouts who haven't even bothered signing on because they were convinced they would no longer qualify for assistance.

Any increase in *their numbers automatically* makes unemployment statistics look better. The Federal Labour Office is not denying that more people are unemployed than their figures indicate.

According to official estimates there were about 832,000 people out of work in 1982 who were not registered in the statistics and not in receipt of benefit.

The corresponding number in 1974 was a mere 206,000.

This estimate means that in 1982 over 1.3m unemployed people in the Federal Republic of Germany received no unemployment benefit.

The authors work on the assumption that in 1983 between 1.6m and two million people out of work will have received neither unemployment benefit nor assistance.

Those who do draw benefit by no means always qualify for the full amount. Christmas and holiday bonuses count toward contributions but not toward benefit, for instance.

So in reality 68 per cent unemployment benefit amounted to only 62 per cent, while unemployment assistance was a mere 53 per cent of take-home pay.

In 1982 the average actual payout was DM975 a month in benefit and DM791 a month in assistance.

In theory that leaves many people with no option but to apply for social security, but some are reluctant to do so for psychological reasons.

Others apply but are disappointed, like Heinz the construction worker's wife. "All they asked was whether we owned property," she said.

The answer was yes, they owned the house they lived in. So the social security officials had told her they would first have to sell the house.

Sell their home? They had worked their fingers to the bone throughout their working lives to pay for the house, and with mortgage payments down to DM560 a month were now paying less than they would have to in rent.

But the means test disqualifies you for benefit if you are a house-owner. That is another reason why only a fraction of those who fail to qualify for unemployment benefits are able to draw social security.

It is the classic poverty trap, the phe*nomenon the authors call the New* Poverty.

Many people really have to pluck up their courage to go to the social security office. A 20-year-old unskilled working girl from Cologne explains why:

"You have to tell them you have nothing to live on, you need food in the house, you have to pay the rent. You go there begging for money. I don't like the idea."

She would sooner work than be dependent on the social security department. Since she is unable to find a regular job she would work unofficially, without paying tax or social security, if the opportunity arose.

She is a victim of the 1982 Act. Before it came into force she could always rely on a little cash from the labour exchange to tide her over between jobs.

Her educational qualifications are strictly limited and she only ever works for short spells, but they used to be long enough to qualify for some benefit, if not for the full year.

Until 1982 she had to have worked for 70 days to qualify for benefit. Since 1982 she has had to have worked for 150 days to draw dole.

But she has never managed to hold on to a job for that long. Jobs as a warehouse worker or hotel cleaner were all she ever had to choose from.

She worked for three or four weeks, then was fired: either because she was no longer needed or because she was not up to the job.

She drew DM158 a week in unemployment assistance. It was just enough to live on. "I'm a thrifty person," she says. She cannot understand why she is now being degraded, as she sees it, to social security.

The people hardest hit by this kind of trap are the ones whose prospects in the labour market are poorest in any case: unskilled and semi-skilled workers, women and young people.

In September over 50 per cent of failed applicants failed because they hadn't enough contributions to qualify for benefit.

The report arrives at the conclusion that unemployment benefit must no longer be paid for a limited period only and that unemployment assistance rates *must be increased substantially.*

Funds are to be raised by a labour market levy payable by civil servants and the self-employed — an old DGB demand.

Günther M. Wiedemann

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 16 December 1983)





■ TRANSPORT

Soviet merchant fleet barges in with cut prices

The Red Fleet has successfully challenged the traditional seafaring nations on shipping routes all over the world.

It has done so virtually unnoticed by a wider public.

Yet the change has been a striking one, no less striking in its way than the appearance of the Soviet navy on all the *seven seas.*

Russia's merchant marine has muscled in on traditional shipping routes and is busy edging out Western shippers by charging rock-bottom rates.

Not even by switching to flags of convenience to cut costs and compete with Russian dumping rates have Western shipowners succeeded in halting the advance of Soviet merchant shipping.

More and more products made in Germany are being shipped overseas on board vessels built in Soviet yards, run under the Soviet ensign and manned by Soviet crews.

It is not just a matter of life or death for German shipowners; it is also of importance for German security policy.

In the event of a crisis or of war, maintaining supplies and keeping food and raw materials coming in would be a purely national task.

In a emergency, ships owned by German owners can be ordered home at full speed, of course, but what if there are none left? What if the German merchant navy has been driven out of business by the competition?

So the existence of a powerful merchant fleet is important, and not just for an economy two thirds of whose imports arrive by sea. It is essential for strategic reasons too.

In a war reinforcements would need *to be shipped across the Atlantic for* both the military and the civilian population.

The commander-in-chief of the Bundesmarine, Vice-Admiral Ansgar Bethge, referred to the navy's importance in a speech at Mürwik naval college, near Flensburg.

Europe, he said, was dependent on overseas supplies of raw materials and on shipping routes. The Red Fleet could easily upset *the apple cart.*

Since 1960 the Soviet merchant navy had progressed from 24th to sixth place among the world's merchant fleets and nudged ahead of the United States.

Russia also had the world's largest fishing fleet by far and the second-largest general cargo fleet. Even in passenger shipping it had outstripped the West.

Figures certainly back up the role the Russians play in world trade by sea these days. Between 30 and 50 per cent of their cargo capacity is used to ship goods between Western and developing countries.

This is known as cross-trading: serving ports other than one's own. Twenty-five per cent of Japan's exports to Europe is shipped on board Soviet freighters.

Sixty per cent of the coffee sold in the Federal Republic of Germany arrives in German *ports* on board Soviet ships from East Africa and Central America.

German importers and exporters are increasingly using Russian ships because they charge freight rates that are unbeatable.

A glance at the situation in Western European ports makes it clear how powerful the Russian position has become.

In the early 1970s Soviet ships were seldom seen in the major North Sea ports. About 1,000 Russian freighters a year now berth in Hamburg, and about 1,500 each in Antwerp and Rotterdam.

This naval invasion has gone hand in hand with the establishment of a network of port and inland agencies enabling Russian shippers to pick up the goods at the factory gate and control domestic container traffic.

The Soviet merchant navy not only earns hard currency. It is also an extension of Russian military power that cannot be overestimated.

Vessels are bult for military use wi*thout costly conversion. Holds are the* exact length needed to double as missile pens.

Merchant seamen are reservists in the Soviet navy. Many ships can be used to land both manpower and equipment.

German ships, regardless whether they still fly the German ensign or have switched to flags of convenience, are manned by African and Asian seamen.

Only the officers are German. The *men may cost only half what German* seamen would cost, but in an emergency they could not be ordered to return to Germany with essential cargoes.

If the Federal Republic were restricted to German ships it would only be able to import a third of the oil it needs and a fifth of the other goods it imports by sea.

Floating on rock-bottom rates . . . A Murmansk-based Russian freighter in Hamburg. (Photo: dpa)

The situation is similar in other West European countries. Undercutting by East Bloc fleets has hit all Western Europeans hard.

Shipowners' clamours for assistance have not fallen on deaf ears in Bonn, especially as the Defence Ministry echoes their sentiments.

Shipping talks between Bonn and Moscow have been held at government level for six years. Agreement was recently reached, but only on the Central *American conference.*

After years of negotiations the Russians finally agreed to rates and quotas.

On the North Atlantic run the problem was solved automatically, as it were, when in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Soviet ships in North American ports were blacked by dockers.

Worries remain about shipping to East Africa and the Far East.

An inter-ministerial conference in Bonn, with the Transport Ministry in the chair, first met in September and is shortly to submit proposals on stemming the tide.

Until details are published we will have no way of telling how many provisions are to be made to support the German merchant navy.

But the Defence Ministry's strategic *misgivings are seen as so important that* the merchant navy is unlikely to be left to the tender mercies of the winds of free market competition, especially the east wind.

Hans-Anton Papendieck

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 28 December 1983)

Row over bid to change air safety controls

Proposals for combined civil and military air safety control operations in West Germany have come in for immediate criticism.

The idea has been mooted by the Transport and Defence Ministries in Bonn under the pretext that a uniform system is needed.

It failed to emerge in the post-war period, the argument runs, because Germany was divided into zones of occupation and standardisation was hampered.

Field trials are first envisaged, leading to the gradual adoption of the entire system at the four regional control centres by the early 1990s.

Air safety control staff have lodged immediate and determined protests because the new idea disregards existing modes of cooperation successfuly practised by the Munich regional control centre in particular.

At first glance the situation that has arisen in the area for which the Federal Air Safety Department (BFS) in Frankfurt is responsible seems grotesque.

The Frankfurt agency is legally in charge of air safety in peacetime, but the Bundeswehr and the former occupying forces still have a say too.

Executive powers are also enjoyed by Eurocontrol, an organisation originally set up by seven European countries but now a clear failure as a result of countries preferring to go it alone.

Eurocontrol has facilities at Maastricht in Holland and Karlsruhe in Germany (Karlsruhe has now been taken over by the BFS).

They are responsible for altitudes above 7,500 metres, and Eurocontrol staff, civil and military, work according to agreed rules and do so jointly.

In Maastricht they sit at separate desks in the same room; in Karlsruhe they sit alongside each other.

In Bremen and Düsseldorf, where altitudes below 7,500 metres are handled, traffic is controlled within firmly allocated zones.

Military staff share a room with civilian officers but sit at separate desks.

In Frankfurt air safety is handled by several Bundeswehr and Allied units and, separately, by the civilian regional control centre.

Munich is the exception. In the Bavarian capital the BFS regional control holds sole responsibility for all air traffic within its area.

Supervision of operations at military airfields is the sole exception. The Munich system has worked splendidly, as everyone agrees, for years.

So the Ministry officials in Bonn do not intend to scrap it immediately. They propose allowing it to continue and postponing a final decision until some later date.

*They may be said to have done so be*cause the Munich system combines optimum safety, economy and flexibility.

Control tower staff feel the combined civil and military arrangement now proposed is more flexible only in respect of limited sectors of military aviation, according to VDF, their trade union.

The advantages are said to be more than outweighed by the safety risk resulting from three organisation holding responsibility for air safety control.

They would be the civilian BFS, the Bundeswehr and Luftwaffe units and the air force units who would supervise sorties by interceptor jets and the use of anti-aircraft missiles in wartime.

The Bonn proposals would be less economic too, so they are not viewed kindly by airline pilots, private pilots and airmen in general.

Roughly 12,200 aircraft take off or land daily in the Federal Republic of Germany. Only about one in nine are military aircraft.

Why not simply adopt the Munich system all over the country? Bonn planners say that would be detrimental to the country's defence capability and not enable Germany to fulfil its defence role.

This argument is hard to accept inasmuch as the Munich system was introduced jointly by both the Transport and Defence Ministries in 1964 and Luftwaffe units in southern Germany are quite happy with it.

It was to have been adopted in north Germany in 1972, but the BFS was short of staff. Two years later civilian control tower staff went on a work-to-rule, so the military doubted whether they could be relied on in an emergency.

If the Munich system had been adopted in the north, there would have been no need for the present controversial proposals.

Rudolf Metzler

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 December 1983)

■ THE CINEMA

Second Sunrise for a silent masterpiece

Sunrise, the first film made in America by German director Fritz Murnau, is again being shown in cinemas more than 50 years after being shot.

Murnau worked with total artistic and financial freedom for three quarters of a year on the film after being invited to Hollywood by 20th Century Fox.

They issued the invitation after Murnau had produced a horror film, *Der letzte Mann*, in which Emil Jannings played the part of a lavatory attendant who became a millionaire.

Sunrise was based on the novel, *Die Reise nach Tilsit*, by Hermann Sudermann. The fact that the copy available is still in good enough condition to be shown again so long after being made is due to the distributors, Concorde.

It is an amazing film. Murnau, who was born Friedrich Wilhelm Plumpe in Bielefeld in 1888, brought the art of black and white silent films to perfection.

He used fade ins, such as from indoor to outdoor scenes, shadow, and various shades of grey. He almost entirely avoided sub titles.

Murnau uses the American actors subtly and thus almost always avoids the theatrical exaggerations that characterised most silent films.

Sunrise, as was typical for Sudermann, was laden with melodrama and was not free of kitsch. The best screen writer of the 1920s, Carl Mayer, slightly altered and simplified it.

Murnau, who wrote his scripts from the point of view of the cameraman, refined Mayer's script.

Worth reading are the passages about *Sunrise* in the book about Murnau written by Lotte Eisner, who only recently died. The book has been recently published by Verlag des Kommunalen Kinos, Frankfurt.

The story in *Sunrise* is like a time immemorial tale: 2 + 1 certainly equals 3 in mathematics. But in love it is not so simple. The three sides to the eternal triangle can be a deadly combination.

In this cases the third side is represented by a vamp (Sudermann represents her as the maid). She entices a young farmer, Anses, to drown his young, blonde wife, Indre.

Anses is played George O'Brien, a dark romantic, vaguely demonic figure similar to Conrad Veidt or Horst Caspar. Indre is the very young Janet Gaynor.

The plan was for Anses to take his wife for a ride on the river in a boat, tip it up and save himself by using a bundle of reeds.

After a night racked by doubts and hours wrestling with his conscience, Anses sets off as planned with his little happy, brightly clothed wife.

Murnau uses light and shadow well here, with the ghostly figure of the vamp appearing and reappearing along the way.

However, Indre's dog tears itself loose from its lease, sets off in pursuit, swims to the boat and instinctively buries its head in Indre's skirt. Anses reluctantly turns back to bring the dog back.

As he brings the boat near the riverbank, he moves threateningly towards his wife.



Fritz Murnau . . . perfected the silent film (Photo: dpa)

But the early morning chimes of the church bells stops him from carrying out his assignment. His terrified wife flees as soon as the boat gets to the bank.

Many scenes of the film are shot on location in Tilsit, in East Prussia, now part of the Soviet Union.

It was the glittering 1920s and Tilsit is captured in that dazzling atmosphere.

One of the central scenes is the couple's attempt at reconciliation. They take a tram for the East Prussian countryside with its sand and moors and gnarled trees, into Tilsit, where they get off walk through the streets of the buzzing city.

Tilsit, a marvel of Rochus Gliese architecture, old cars, plush cafes with glass walls, a hairdressing salon with a bubikopf doll in the window and face cloths being heated in shiny steel balls, luring the farmer to a hand manicure.

Luna park with shooting galleries and a high-flying roller coaster, a dance bar with a couple in intimate juxtaposition . . . Murnau does not try and prevent a certain comic effect.

Amid the glitter and the tinsel, love is again discovered anew. The trip back for Anses and Indre is over moonlit water, soft, peaceful and gliding, under a gentle light.

Sudenly thunder rolls. The couple turn back for Tilsit in fright. The boat capsizes. Anses wraps Indre up in a bundle of reeds, the same bundle he was to have saved himself with.

Anses manages to find a foothold on the rocky bank, but Indre is nowhere to be seen. Farmers carrying torches mount a hunt.

Overhead the vamp hovers like a cat waiting for love to free itself again. Anses finds her and strangles her.

But Indre is alive. An old farmer gives Anses the news. The bundle of

Continued on page 13



Reconciliation in Tilsit . . . the tram scene in 'Sunrise.' (Photo: Concorde-Film)

Discarded scenes reveal work methods of Charlie Chaplin

The unshown work of Charlie Chaplin is the greatest unknown treasure in cinema history, wrote Joe Hembus in his 1972 book about Chaplin.

He described how Chaplin would make extensive changes until he put together the final production. The chops and changes would involve variations and re-shooting whole scenes and sequences.

Six years after Chaplin's death, two Englishmen have brought to public light some of the discarded footage. Kevin Brownlow and David Gill were researching for their 13-episode history of Hollywood silent films when they discovered material, helped by Chaplin's widow and other sources.

Although much has been documented about Chaplin, little has been revealed about his work method. Until now.

The result of the work of Brownlow and Gill is a film, The Unknown Chaplin, now being screened on German television. He basically worked without a script. Footage not used in the finished product was kept, not thrown away. Chaplin was his own principal actor. He was the judge of the quality of the scenes and of the work of his colleagues. Because he preferred to work with people without acting experience, repeated scenes were no rarity. Virginia Cherril, who played the main female role in *City Lights*, said Chaplin first went through every role himself. There was no work method. Chaplin just said that he wanted this and that done. And he showed exactly how it was to be done.

And Chaplin himself once said that he waited for the set to be built without having an idea in his head. But when the set had taken shape, the ideas came of their own accord.

But it was not always that simple. Georgie Hale, the main female role in *Goldrush*, remembers that Chaplin let everybody wait.

"It didn't matter how much they earned or how much it would cost him. He sat himself in his stool and let us wait for hours, sometimes all day, until the inspiration came."

When work began on *The Cure* in 1917, there was only one thing established. That was the set — a sanatorium and a drinking fountain — plus a set of revolving doors.

A dozen takes had been made of the same scene. Without success. Suddenly, during clowning, Chaplin's stick accidentally became caught in the revolving door. It was the best gag of the whole film.

He left the scene in and cut out another in which he played the role of a page boy. Instead he became an alcoholic patient.

These changes did not happen only occasionally. *The Immigrant* was only half made when it occurred to Chaplin that the sersatile Henry Bergmann was in the wrong role as a waiter.

He chopped the scene and used the bull-like Eric Campbell.

And during the shooting of *City Lights*, he sacked Virginia Cherril, the female lead, because he didn't like the way she played the last scene.

He used Georgia Hale for the last scene and decided to shoot the whole film again using her. The plan fell through because, as shown in The Unknown Chaplin, Georgia Hale was not suitable.

Chaplin was the perfectionist: in the two-act *The Adventurer*, he began one scene with a Spanish dancer. But he couldn't develop suitable gags.

More than 500 attempts were made to get the scene right. Then he threw the whole thing out.

This drive for perfectionism was carried even further when after 1917 he took over full control of his films.

With *City Lights*, for example, he took 30 months on the set, although this was at the time when sound films were beginning to come in.

Above all, the key scene gave difficulty. This was where the blind flower girl mistakes the tramp for a millionaire.

By the autumn of 1930, Chaplin had spent a total of 534 days on the set. No work had taken place on 368 of those days.

Chaplin might have discarded a lot of material, but he didn't forget it. Often it was used in later pictures.

Frank Arnold

(Der Tagesspiegel, 18 December 1983)



Chaplin in 1924 signing the contract with Lita Grey to play the female lead in 'Goldrush.' (Photo: NDR)

■ EDUCATION

Religion at school: success 'is being not meaningless'

Sabine Etzold has asked teachers and senior students at Cologne schools what importance they attach to religious instruction. Some of her findings come as a surprise.

Asked why she opted for religious instruction at school, one 16-year-old Cologne schoolgirl gave an answer Faust's Gretchen would be unlikely to have given 200 years ago.

"I chose it as a special subject because it's fairly easy and enables you to average better grades," she frankly admitted.

The regulations govering Protestant religious instruction at senior school in Germany unsurprisingly take a different view.

Instruction is intended "to give the pupils a critical understanding of Christian beliefs in their historical context and of other religious and ideological viewpoints."

There is a gap between the two objectives so wide that theory and practice, intention and reality, are virtually irreconcilable.

Are young people today still interested in understanding Christian beliefs? Is it not truer to say that they arrive at their view of the world from other, non-religious or alien religious approaches?

Or have the peace movement or church assembly initiatives led to the emergence of a new piety that has given religious instruction a fresh impetus?

Some would argue that there have in reality merely been fresh flights of fancy that have passed religion as taught at school entirely by.

Religious instruction, the argument then runs, is merely a soft option that enables students to improve their grades. Is it?

The girl who so frankly admitted her opportunist reasons for taking religious instruction had more to say:

"Our teacher is really good. She went through George Orwell's 1984 with us, which is the sort of thing many other teachers wouldn't think of doing.

"They are the kind that only go on about God and Jesus and so on."

So whatever may have changed over the years, it is as true of religious instruction as of any other subject that it's the teacher that counts.

The teacher's knack of selecting material and getting it across is of vital importance, in this case in generating understanding of Christian beliefs.

His personal success or failure will largely determine whether pupils are prepared to pay any attention to the subject.

Religious instruction may be regarded as a soft option, but that alone is seldom more than a convenient, if minor consideration.

Teachers are well aware of the fact. Gertrud Kratzenberg, who has given Roman Catholic religious instruction for over 20 years, has this to say about what she feels she must do as a teacher:

"I try to put information across in a context that interests the pupils. That's part of my job of teaching them the subject."

Ruth Albrecht, who has taught Protestant religious instruction for an equal length of time, has this to say about the problem of responsibility:

"It's great when a teacher is fascinating and thrilling. But just try and be thrilling for over 20 years!"

Religious instruction is an optional subject, and the opportunity of studying something else instead has led to competition for pupil interest.

With the number of schoolchildren on the decline, more may be at stake than just the prestige of the individual teacher.

Michael Jacobs, a trainee teacher, feels this pressure on the teacher to interest his pupils has become a danger in religious instruction.

"You think harder than in other subjects how to make it exciting. The competition can make a teacher feel obliged to entertain the class and keep them interested."

Yet the mere fact that the popularity of religious instruction depends heavily on the individual teacher's prowess makes it virtually impossible to tell whether interest in it has declined.

There are signs that there has been very little change, although the students have changed, as have their interests and expectations, problems and questions.

Michael Jacobs tries to assess the change in terms of his own days as a schoolboy:

"In our day we were much more strongly influenced by protest against the church and the establishment. I would say indifference is the hallmark of young people's attitudes toward religion today.

"Religion is irrelevant to the daily lives of most of them, with the result that you can presuppose less and less knowledge about Biblical traditions or Christian history."

What topics fascinate students today? Ruth Albrecht deals, in lessons for a class of school-leavers, with a text on sexuality and marriage.

She quotes a poem by theologian Dorothee Sölle that deals in a provocative and emancipatory manner with the oppression of women.

To begin with, the class don't show much interest. One girl is busy knitting. The others occasionally make comments and ask questions.

There are few differences of opinion about the text, which outlines both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant attitudes on holy wedlock and sexuality.

All are agreed that the Catholic viewpoint, which is that sex is only permissible between husband and wife, is out of the question.

They are also agreed that partnership and marriage amount to more than just sex.

But the debate livens up when Dorothee Sölle's poem is discussed. It consists of four verses, each starting with the words: "We don't want . . ."

It is all about women's lib, and the issue is explosive. "She is too hard on men," one girl feels. "Maybe they used to be like that, but men too have become emancipated."

Yet a boy will hear nothing of women's lib even: "I'd like to see the wife who doesn't want to be looked after and protected."

What do such issues and such debates have to do with religion? Is there not a risk of teachers reducing religious instruction to an undefinable anything-or-nothing subject?

Are they not going to the other extreme from an erstwhile attitude of relying on the Scriptures and the Book of Common Prayer?

The Protestant regulations state that: "Protestant religious instruction must consider what the meaning, yardstick and fulfilment of life can be."

That unquestionably makes religious instruction more general than other subjects. Ruth Albrecht sees it as "a groundwork for educating young people to humanity."

She sees her job as that of showing up the inhuman character of certain structures, political aspects and human behaviour.

It is also one of showing approaches to a more human life, and this objective naturally has repercussions.

Peace and the peace movement were a controversial subject in religious instruction at school long before education policymakers agreed on how to tackle what is undeniably a tricky issue.

Teachers have noted with alarm how views have increasingly tended to clash irreconcilably at school. They see this as a fresh challenge and need to state where *they* stand on the subject.

Gertrud Kratzenberg is keen to stay strictly neutral. She sees her task as that of encouraging her students to be tolerant and thereby offsetting polarisation.

Ruth Albrecht is strictly in favour of supporting the peace movement: "I'm against saying teachers ought not to comment on political issues so as not to influence pupils.

"That's simply absurd. As a teacher I influence them in any case."

A further new and explosive topic in religious instruction is the debate on alien religions, arguably necessitated by the growing number of foreign schoolchildren.

A new issue that has also arisen is the strong tendency of many young people toward pseudo-religious subjectivity.

It presents religious instruction teachers with yet another tough task. "This new piety is clearly the expression of a religious need, but it is to some extent extremely dangerous as it can easily lead to self-mirroring.

"We will have to see what is given short shrift at church and what can possibly be included in lessons," says Michael Jacobs.

Religious instruction aims at a critical viewpoint and at teaching world responsibility, but it no longer claims that Christianity has a monopoly of values and pays very little attention to the church as an institution.

"It has nothing to do with the church," students say, and teachers agree that their role is not that of fishers of men on the church's behalf.

Maybe that is why the church at times doesn't attach must importance to the religious benefit to be derived from religious instruction as given at school.

This, for instance, is what the joint synod of Federal Republic dioceses agreed in 1974:

"Progress has been made when children on leaving school at least don't regard religion and belief as superfluous or even meaningless."

Sabine Etzold

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 24 December 1983)



"I try and keep everyone interested," says teacher Gertrud Kratzenberg here taking a class in Cologne. (Photo: Holubovsky)

■ MEDICINE

Delving into the roots of depression

Munich medical research scientists have laid the groundwork for safe diagnosis and purposeful therapy of various kinds of depression.

Long-term trials involving about 200 patients were carried out by Professor Paul Matussek and his staff at the Max Planck Society's psychopathology and psychotherapy research unit.

The characteristics of personality patterns among depressive patients came very clearly to light.

Successful depression therapy presupposes a safe diagnosis, which is not always possible given the symptoms, especially in distinguishing between endogenous and non-endogenous, i.e. neurotic depressions.

"In nearly one case in three," Professor Matussek says, "non-endogenous, or neurotic, and endogenous symptoms differ only insignificantly.

"A clearer distinction can be drawn between them when the case history, especially the number and nature of previous crises, is taken into account.

"In addition, the postulate of including personality patterns as a means of clarifying depression diagnosis at times is made."

Professor Matussek and his staff began to check the various theories by launching a long-term project 15 years ago.

Two hundred patients suffering from depression were interviewed two or three times a week for about six months on average.

The aim was to pick up seemingly unimportant or personal details such as are frequently given short shrift during a routine check at hospital or at a nerve specialist's practice.

"The case was covered by the investigator in such detail," Professor Matussek says, "that a relationship of trust developed between doctor and patient in which subtler points arising from the patient's life came to light."

In addition to clinical analysis seven standardised questionnaires were used. They made it possible to conduct an objective check and quantitative survey of personality traits that were considered characteristic of depression. Findings were compared with those for a control group of 40 people who did not suffer from bouts of depression. Data were compiled over a period of 12 years and clinical evaluation has yet to be completed, but initial findings of the questionnaires have emerged in terms of factor analysis. First, clear distinctions arose between three different groups of depressive patients and the control group.

Personality patterns of the various forms of depression (neurotic, endogenous-unipolar and endogenous-bipolar) showed certain similarities, just as similarities arise in respect of the symptoms of bouts of depression.

"This is surprising," Professor Matussek says, "inasmuch as a number of schools of thought say that although crisis symptoms may show some similarities, they will not arise in connection with personality patterns.

"Clear distinctions are often called for here, but they are only made within certain limits."

Personality patterns that are shared are mainly difficulties in establishing inter-personal relationships, based on mistrust and dissatisfaction, and a more or less hostile attitude toward life as a whole.

They are people who are easily upset. They are frequently annoyed, and strongly so. They tend to level accusations at themselves and others. They are emotionally unstable.

Despite these points held in common there are a number of differences between the individual types of personality.

Endogenous-bipolar and neurotic people show considerably clearer signs of aggressive responses. Their ability to keep their emotions in check is poorly developed.

They are afraid of losing people they love and tend to feel guilty. People suffering from bipolar depression tend to come midway between the other two groups.

Typical personality traits of the bipolar are longings for success, an inclination to behave in a compulsive manner and to be pedantic, dependence on authority, determination to hold through and inner detachment from other people.

A third combination of characteristics, described as the striving for autonomy, also arose. In its case the neurotic depressives head the list.

They are not just aggressive in their reactions but also unduly keen on autonomy: outrageous autonomy, as Erik Erikson puts it.

It is a trait as a result of which they regard *their* principles, *their* views and *their* preferences as the overriding yardstick of their contacts with other people.

If they are unable to prevail on others loudly, they will try to do it quietly, in a more unobtrusive manner, by means of illness or seemingly coincidental habits such as shyness and stuttering.

The aim of laying down one's own laws and admitting of no authority over oneself is accompanied by a series of depressive symptoms.

This mustn't always immediately be reflected in the patient's behaviour, Professor Matussek says: "The over-autonomous personality can at times seem extremely friendly and even compliant and easy-going. But in certain social situations, such as married life, it will have a sting like a scorpion's."

It will suddenly develop sadistic traits that come as a surprise to those acquainted only with the adjusted side of the patient's personality.

Neurotic and endogenous depressives differ from each other in terms of over-autonomy.


These characteristics have been worked out by means of statistical procedures that enable a quantitative assessment to be made of their share of the patient's personality.

They are thus based on objective data but still, Professor Matussek admits, need to be made more graphic and subjected to clinical scrutiny:

"But findings so far have nonetheless contributed toward a more purposive and effective psychotherapy of the various categories of depression."

Horst Meermann

(Der Tagesspiegel, 24 December 1983)



Just to make you feel better . . .

The new Aachen University Hospital is a compromise between the needs of man and science, according to one observer. The hospital is spread over an area equal to 20 football fields. Under the one roof are included a complete medical faculty with lecture halls, research facilities and laboratories. There are 30 operating theatres and 1,500 beds in single and double rooms. (Photo: P. Winandy)

Personality and the link with heart attacks

The medical profession is increasingly coming to realise that illnesses must not necessarily have exclusively physical causes.

They can also be due to mental factors, at least in part.

Psychosomatics is the branch of medicine that deals with the relationship between these two aspects of being ill. It has gained increasing importance in recent years.

It played a crucial part at the Wiesbaden congress of the German Psychoanalytical Association, where links between personality structure and possibilities of treating heart attack patients were discussed.

Doctors cannot do patients justice by concentrating treatment solely on curing physical upsets and compeltely ignoring mental aspects.

Most people rightly feel a heart atack is an incisive event. The biochemical processes that trigger it largely make scientific sense in the wake of recent research.

There is a fissure in the wall of the previously damaged and occluded coronary vessels and a blood clot occurs that interrupts the supply of blood to part of the cardiac muscle.

Yet among younger heart attack patients in particular, psychoanalysts were told in Wiesbaden, a career or family breakdown is almost always found to have occurred in the patient's recent case history.

Not infrequently these patients have delegated important functions that form part of their personalities and part of their selves.

They feel safe and sound within the family circle. The wife looks after private affairs. The tale is much the same at work, where order prevails by virtue of practical considerations.

"The company" or "the state" often take the place of personal relationships in this context.

As long as this order works and the patient adjusts to it, he can derive from it strong feelings of security and of personal grandeur, importance and recognition.

But once the order breaks down and, say, the wife dies, the patient has a breakdown and a personal crisis. He begins to suffer from a lack of awareness of having an inimitable personality of his own.

"This characteristic," says Dieter Ohlmeier, from Kassel, "is typical of the personality structure of actual and potential heart attack patients."

Could a heart attack occur as the result of an order upset? Analysts say psychological factors contribute toward a heart attack in at least 50 per cent of cases.

It msut be borne in mind that previous organic damage, such as changes in the coronary arteries, overweight, high blood pressure and heavy smoking, have some kind of psychological case history of their own.

Yet basically, psychoanalysts still know far too little about the psychological conditions under which a heart attack may ensue after a period of months or years.

There seems to be no doubt that social factors can play an important part.

(Bremer Nachrichten, 14 December 1983)

The old need vitamins

Vitamin deficiency can cause mental upsets among old people, says a Göttingen University nutritionist, Volker Pudel.


A survey of over 1,000 people is to be conducted to find out in greater detail what forms they take.

One aim of the project will be to find out whether disturbances can be remedied by giving patients an adequate supply of vitamins.

Up to 24 per cent of old people tested have been found deficient in the vitamin B complex. Seventeen per cent of men and seven per cent of women were short of vitamin C.

The effects range from ill-humour and a bad memory to depression and emotional instability, Professor Pudel says.

(Nordwest Zeitung, 16 December 1983)



■ HEALTH

Promotion bid for herbal medicine

A society to promote herbal medicine and homeopathy has been founded by Bonn President Karl Carstens and his wife, Veronica, who is a doctor specialising in internal medicine.

It is hoped to raise money for research into this type of medicine. Support has come from many including former North Rhine-Westphalian Economic Affairs Minister Gerhard Kienbaum and a former state secretary at the Bonn Interior Ministry, Günter Hartkopf.

The society will use donations and membership fees (minimum DM50 a year) to back current research. Eventually it is hoped to commission new projects.

Dr Carstens uses homeopathy in her own practice. She says it is only prejudice that leads many people to view it with disdain.

Two years ago, Herr and Frau Carstens decided to leave money in their will for the promotion of natural medicines. They have no children.

Some 45 per cent of doctors in private practice in Germany already use natural methods sometimes occasionally and five per cent use them predominantly.

The "bio craze" has led to the establishment of many companies that deal in "biologically harmless" but ineffective medicines.

But there are also many initiatives by patients and doctors who are prepared to put money into promoting natural medicines.

There are also rudimentary efforts in conventional medical science to find treatments without side effects.

Major pharmaceutical companies are setting up research laboratories in tropical countries.

The Foundation for the Promotion of Natural Medicine, founded by President and Dr Carstens two years ago, has already had some success at German universities.

The Universities of Hanover, Heidelberg and Düsseldorf have since introduces lectures on biological medicine. And, following a student initiative, a Munich University professor will lecture on the relationship between conventional and natural medicine.

Dr Carstens says this is "a major step in the right direction."

And since research into the practical application of natural medicine is costly the promotion society will use donations and membership dues to promote research.

One major obstacle still has to be overcome: The national health service frequently refuses to pay for herbal medicines because of lack of scientific proof of its effectiveness.

Proof is particularly difficult to provide in homeopathy because it is geared to individual symptoms.

dpa

(Rheinische Post, 17 December 1983)

Continued from page 10

reeds had carried her to safety. The dawn comes up and the lovers embrace.

In 1931, four years after the film was shot, Murnau was killed in a car accident in America. He was the only one to die when the rental car driven by a young Filipino and carrying several others, turned over after swerving to avoid an oncoming truck.

The accident was on March 11. On March 18, the premiere of his last film, *Tabu*, shot in the South Seas, was shown in New York.

Murnau was buried in Berlin on the suggestion of his brother, in a graveyard which is now in the East sector of the city. He was 43.

In America, only 11 Americans turned up for the memorial service. One was Greta Garbo.

Brigitte Jeremias

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 23 December 1983)

Chancellor's wife sponsors aid for brain-injury victims

Frankfurter Allgemeine

An organisation has been founded to provide after-care for people who suffer brain damage in accidents.

Kuratorium ZNS für Unfallverletze mit Schäden des zentralen Nervensystems e. V. has been set up on the initiative of Frau Hannelore Kohl, wife of the Chancellor.

Frau Kohl has been the patron of the *Walter Poppelreuther Haus* rehabilitation clinic in Vallendar, Rhineland-Palatinate, for 12 years.

She wants the new body to try and get help to where it is most needed.

There are three stages of treatment. Bottlenecks in the second phase of the treatment of severe brain damage cases are still common, say the two medical members of the society, Professor Klaus Mayer, head of the Tübingen Neurological Clinic, and Werner Arens, head of the Ludwigshafen Accident Clinic.

The first treatment phase, of surgery and life-saving measures, is in neurosurgery departments. The third phase is when the patients are fully conscious again and undergo training to enable them to resume work.

The problem, the two doctors say, lies in the fact that the patients must leave the neurosurgery clinic after surgery and that there is a shortage of suitable facilities.

At that stage, the patients were still unconscious. They regained consciousness gradually in the receiving hospital. But there were only 500 suitable places available in the Federal Republic.

The new society's first task would be to provide a list of those places that were available ard distribute it to doctors throughout the country. This would save time, which is was extremely important.


Some 200,000 people a year received head and brain injuries in accidents in this country. About half injuries were severe, and 20 to 30 per cent caused permanent damage.

The society intends to use donations to establish the therapy facilities in hospitals that are close to surgical clinics and are staffed by experts and suitably equipped.

Frau Kohl has said that she would direct her fund-raising drive primarily at industry, especially motorcycle manufacturers, and insurance companies.

Three of the society's board members are representatives of the Association of Victims of Brain Damage. It has 80,000 members, and its decades of experience are bound to be useful.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 23 December 1983)



President Karl and Dr Veronica Carstens . . . support for natural medicine. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Hannelore Kohl . . . getting help to where it is needed. (Photo: Poly-Press)

■ THE THIRD REICH

Judges look at how the law was administered

Thirty-eight years after the war's end the German Judges' Academy in Trier has held its first course on The Law under National Socialism.

One of the lecturers, a former barrister and later chief clerk of Peine, Dr Wilde, told a tale interspersed with personal memories of the Third Reich.

Soon after Hitler assumed power, he said, members of the legal profession who had kept a clear head told each other the following joke.

The Nazis were busy scrapping the civil code and replacing it by Aryan law, which consisted of a mere two paragraphs.

The first stated that the good of the community held precedence over individual good. The second said that the local Nazi leader could lay down exceptions.

Dr Wilde recalled his days as a defence counsel in Berlin and the bitter earnest behind what was bound to seem to younger lawyers to be a harmless or even incomprehensible witticism.

Those were the days when an SA officer could order a dress uniform from a Jewish tailor and not even pay the bill when a writ was served by the tailor's lawyer.

The Nazi official went on to win the case when it came up before a civil court. The court agreed with his view, which was that:

"The Jew boy can count himself lucky I even gave him an order. He'd better not be impertinent enough to insist on payment."

Wilde was only one of the lecturers whose services were enlisted in this first bid to shed light on the judiciary in the Third Reich by the Trier academy.

He is, however, the author of a book dealing with the subject. Entitled *Tödlicher Alltag* (Lethal Daily Round), it was published under the pseudonym of Dietrich Güstrow.

Other speakers included university professors who took an academic look at the period on the basis of documents that have survived.

Then there was a Berlin public prosecutor who is still, 38 years after the event, probing the activities of Nazi judges who are still alive.

They all came to Trier to outline to young judges and public prosecutors what perversion of justice members of the legal profession all too readily allowed themselves to be persuaded to accept.

The hosts at Trier were the Lower Saxon Justice Minister, Werner Remmers, and the Lower Saxon political education centre.

Since 1981 courses have been held at the Lower Saxon Judges' Academy in Königslutter to teach members of the profession more about the far from distant past.

The topic is still political dynamite. The judiciary has found it extremely difficult to come to terms with its past in any way at all.

There is not a single instance of a Nazi judge responsible for terror sentences who was later brought to book for his perversion of justice.

Judge Frehtse, a Volksgerichshof judge who was to blame for death sentences passed in series, was the only one ever prosecuted.

He was charged with being an accessary to murder, but cleared. Others never as much as stopped working as judges; they stayed on the bench after the war and gained preferment.

But not all of them went on to chalk up such a superb career as Hans Maria Globke, secretary of state at Konrad Adenauer's Chancellor's Office for many years.

Dr Globke was the author of a particularly obnoxious commentary on the Nuremberg race laws.

Dr Majer, a lecturer at Karlsruhe University, said the sociological structure of a judiciary largely handed down from the Kaiser's days was, in her view, the main reason why Nazi views so quickly gained a firm foothold.

It was why the comment attributed by Dr Wilde to the Nazi Party judge Walter Buch, that "the Jew is not a human being but a state of decomposition," was quick to find its way into legal codes and case law.

The judiciary, she said, was opposed to democracy and the Weimar Republic just like other leading bourgeois groups were.

In comparison with the centre-left coalitions that upheld the Weimar Republic they felt right-wing extremist groups were the lesser evil.

Since the system of legal standards was initially maintained in the Third

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Reich the judiciary willingly adjusted to the new rulers.

This led to subordination and compliance even where the Nazi regime had not insisted on them.

The legal profession had then formalised what the Nazis did want. Discrimination, Dr Majer said, was unexceptionable; the judiciary merely wanted to see it regularised.

The Jews were the first to discover how thoroughly the Third Reich judiciary set about the task. They were reduced to a position in which they retained no legal rights whatever.

Judge Asbrock, from Bremen, mentioned in Trier a ruling given by a rent tribunal in the early 1930s. It upheld an eviction on the ground that the tenant was a Jew.

This scandalous ruling had no effect on the judge's career. He went on to become a a senior judge in Franconia in the 1950s, Judge Asbrock said.

It was agreed in Trier that the rent tribunal could have reached a different decision without the Nazis harming as much as a hair on the judge's head.

This would probably have been the case with most judges at other courts who lacked the courage to baulk at perverting justice.

No judge was penalised by the Nazis and a civil servant who forged official documents was merely reprimanded for his misdemeanour even though the Nazis could have taken a much sterner view.

He had declared children of mixed marriages to be the result of extramarital intercourse by the Aryan mother to avoid the children being stigmatised as half-Jews.

Public prosecutor Reinders, from Celle, told the tale of Ewald Schlitt to illustrate how quick the judiciary were to react to comments by Hitler or other Nazi leaders.

Schlitt, a Wilhelmshaven man, was sentenced to five years' jail in Oldenburg early in 1942 for wife-beating (his wife died in a clinic).

Hitler heard about the case and was most indignant about the sentence in his last speech to the Reichstag. He ordered the Reich Justice Ministry to intervene.

The sentence was revoked and the case reheard in Berlin. Schlitt was sentenced to death and executed a mere 10 days after his first sentence.

Dr Wilde recalled instances from his days as defence counsel when the Gestapo altered sentences they didn't like.

Two Berlin thieves who had been given prison sentences for breaking and entering were shot in the corridor of the court building by Gestapo officers.

They were naturally said to have been shot while trying to make a getaway.

Professor Rüping, from Augsburg, noted in Trier that the control the judiciary might have exercised in the Third Reich was limited by practical considerations.

Hitler's word was law, but finding out what the Führer wanted doing and putting it into legal effect was easier said than done.

In the later days of the Third Reich the police lent the judiciary a hand. Regardless of sentences passed, people accused of "racial disgrace," treason or Bible studies were taken into custody.

From 1942 on Reich Justice Minister Thierack handed recidivists over to the SS for "extermination by means of labour."

But because people associated with these moves are still alive, access to legal documents remains extremely difficult, even for research purposes, Professor Rüping complained.

Herr Spletzer, a high-ranking West Berlin civil servant who was associated with the proceedings against Judge Rehse and his fellow-members of the Volksgerichtshof, said the public prosecutor's office in West Berlin was for years denied access to important documents in the GDR Central Archives in Potsdam.

The authorities did not start proceedings in this case until very late, and they ended with the disastrous dropping of charges against Judge Rehse.

Investigations were resumed in 1980 to prove once and for all that the Volksgerichtshof was not a regular court and its judges did not enjoy special judicial privileges.

They have yet to be completed, Herr Spletzer said, adding that some of the court's high treason sentences were not unconstitutional and would have to be passed in just the same way today.

His audience did not take kindly to this comment. Judge Schmahl was one of those who objected. But Herr Spletzer, sounding a note of sober resignation, said it was simply not enough to accuse the judges concerned of having passed sentences as part of a criminal system of government.

The legal machinery of the Third Reich continued to work after it was all over, as the tale of Judge Bumke, the last chief justice of the Reichsgericht in Leipzig, shows.

He committed suicide on 22 April 1945 as the Americans were moving in toward the city. That autumn, long after the war was over, his widow was officially requested to return his robes.

They were not his private properety, having been paid for by the Reich. This macabre joke is surely one of the ironies of history.

Hans-Peter Sattler

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 20 December 1983)

Nazi crimes: the hunt continues

Auschwitz and Majdanek stand both for Nazi concentration camps and the gas chamber and post-war court cases in which Germany has sought to come to terms with the past.

Proceedings were largely made possible by the work of the Ludwigsburg central office set up 25 years ao to probe Nazi crimes.

A staff of 35, including 10 judges and public prosecutors, are still busy collecting, collating, evaluating and referring to the courts all available material on Nazi crimes.

The Ludwigsburg files, generally considered one of the most exhaustive collections of documents on Nazi crimes of violence in the world, total 1.3 million entries.

They list people, over 16,000 places where offences are reported to have been committed, and roughly 3,750 Nazi departments and units.

The central office also has a collection of over half a million documents. Staff feel their job is not only to get at the facts and unearth evidence but also to keep up the constant task of coming to terms with Germany's past.

The latest figures show that their work is not yet over. 129 cases are still pending, while over 1,700 trials are still in progress.

Over the past 25 years 4,645 preliminary proceedings have been concluded and the findings handed over to the public prosecutor's office.

Between the end of the war and the beginning of 1983 proceedings were launched against over 88,000 people. There were 6,465 sentences, with none being passed in cases against over 80,000 people.

These figures alone clearly indicate that all has not been plain sailing. The discrepancy between the number of cases and the number of convictions is due in part to the passage of time.

As years go by it is increasingly difficult to investigate allegations and unearth evidence.

Many cases have been brought to a conclusion by the death or illness of the accused, but in a growing number of cases a conviction was no longer possible because the evidence was not conclusive.

The Ludwigsburg officials' job has been made harder by the fact that German courts in the immediate post-war period tended to concentrate on ordinary criminal offences.

People may have been upset by what came to light at the Nuremberg trials but not enough to take an immediate and intensive interest in their Nazi past.

It was not until the mid-1950s that the case of a former SS officer who sued the Federal Republic for reinstatement made people think again.

Witnesses in his case gave evidence that he had been associated with mass extermination of Jews.

The Ludwigsburg office has a close working relationship with the authorities in countries all over the world, including most East Bloc countries and the United States.

Collaboration is close and effective. Only the GDR still refuses to lend any assistance. It has done so for years without divulging a reason.

Volker Dieckmann

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 2 December 1983)

■ SECURITY

Alert against truck-bomb attacks

Security has been stepped up in Germany following truck-bomb attacks on American installations in Beirut and Kuwait.

The *Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA) has information that suicide truck attacks may be made on Nato and American military bases in Germany.

US forces headquarters in Heidelberg says a staggered defensive barracade consisting of military lorries and concrete-filled barrels has been set up.

The American consulate general in Frankfurt is being guarded by armoured units of the Hesse police.

Police in Rüsselsheim, near Frankfurt, have caught a new terrorist group. This has fuelled suspicions that similar small cells are preparing attacks.

A BKA officer says: "We have received a number of tipoffs that, following the failure of demonstrations to stop missiles deployment, extremist groups now intend to use violence."

The Rüsselsheim group is not one of the notorious Revolutionary Cells. It is an entirely new grouping of Red Army Faction (RAF) sympathisers that might want to continue RAF terror operations with a new strategy.

Since the arrest of RAF leaders Brigitte Mohnhaupt, Christian Klar and Adelheid Schulz, the organisation has been regarded as leaderless and largely paralysed. Some hard-core members have escaped abroad.

Shortly after the successes against the RAF, the police seized papers in which members of the organisation criticised themselves, saying that "we have made it too easy for the cops."

By living underground, these papers say, the RAF provided the police with too many clues. The idea now is to follow the organisational patterns of the Revolutionary Cells and form small, independently operating groups.

The police have so far been largely unsuccessful against them.

The authorities estimate that there are some 12 such cells in the Federal Republic and West Berlin, each with three to eight members.

Members were, like other people, registered and had regular jobs.

Their bombs were made from readily available chemicals.

During an investigation into bomb-making methods, security officers came across certain chemicals, among them the weed killer *Unkraut-Ex*.


Police tried to find out if anyone had bought large quantities of the herbicide, especially in the Rhine-Main area.

During the dragnet the latest RAF group was caught.

Two members, a university student and an electrician at the Opel works, had bought 17 kilos of *Unkraut-Ex* over three months. They had no garden.

Horst Zimmermann

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 22 December 1983)



American Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger in Washington shows off the computer equipment seized in Hamburg before it could be transshipped to Moscow.

(Photo: AP)

Moscow-bound US computer seized

An American computer seized in Hamburg before it could be shipped to the Soviet Union would have helped the Russians improve their missiles system, say the Americans.

The VAX 11/782 is now back in the US. It is on a list of items banned from export to East Bloc countries.

(Another computer headed for the Soviet Union has since been seized in Sweden).

American Treasury Secretary Donald Regan and Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger have praised the German-American cooperation that led to the Hamburg seizure.

The $1.5m computer installation, complete with programming manuals, has been shown to newsmen at the US Treasury.

Installations of this type are subject to an absolute export ban to East Bloc countries.

Weinberger said that the VAX 11/782 would have enabled the USSR to improve the accuracy of its missile systems, speed up its development of military computers and curb the effectiveness of the US defence system.

In 1981, the Reagan Administration launched its "Operation Exodus" to halt the outflow of American weapons and technology to the East Bloc.

Some 350 violations of the ban have been recorded by the US Customs authorities, Regan said.

dpa

(Mannheimer Morgen, 21 December 1983)

Keeping tabs on extremists of both the left and the right

Extremist groups of both the left and the right are targets for the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV), the federal office for the protection of the constitution.

Specific priorities include the German Communist Party (DKP) and terror groups.

BfV president Heribert Hellenbroich says that although the DKP has almost no electoral support, it receives almost unlimited funds from East Germany.

Its involvement in — though not steering of — the Peace Movement has helped it to get a foot into many doors.

Among the DKP's main targets are trade unions and works councils.

The BfV expects the party to begin stepping up activities in favour of the 35-hour work week.

In the right extremist camp, membership of the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) has declined to 6,000. The party barely counts.

On the other hand, Frey's *Deutsche Volksunion* (German People's Union), a grouping of "elderly pensioners," has a growing membership of more than 10,000, and funds are flowing.

There are some 230 known militant neo-Nazis plus 70 "Young National Democrat" who are regarded as violent.

The criminal intentions of the right wingers are shown by attacks on US installations last year. Several people were injured.

The so-called Action Front of National Socialists has been banned on the recommendation of the BfV because it advocated the re-establishment of Nazism.

On the left, the real terror threat is not the disorganised remnants of the Red Army Faction (RAF) whose remaining six to ten hard core members have probably gone underground in Germany, but the Revolutionary Cells.

Since they have no umbrella organisation and operate as "spare-time terrorists," it is almost impossible to pinpoint them. So far, they have not attacked people, but there seems to be a growing readiness to do so.

Some 400 bomb attacks were recorded



in 1983, and the Revolutionary Cells are likely to have been responsible for many of them.

BfV says it is difficult to judge what is happening in the area that the peace movement now seems to be leaving.

There are indications that some attacks on US installations and German arms factories are attributable to the terrorist fringe.

But BfV draws a clear line: It is not segments of the peace movement that are migrating towards terrorism. It is the violent elements that are joining the peace movement.

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 22 December 1983)